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AM I MY PARTNER'S KEEPER? PEER
REVIEW IN LAW FIRMS
SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY*
[Tihe actions of a partner you don't even know,
working in an office on the other side of the country,
could cost you your house and force your kids to go to
public school.1
INTRODUCTION
This lament captures the concern of attorneys who bemoan
their liability exposure for the acts or omissions of their law
partners. In the wake of the explosion of legal malpractice
claims, attorneys are reappraising the risks of law firm practice.
Until recently, the risks were largely covered by professional
liability insurance. Still, as dramatized by the $41 million
settlement paid by the New York-based firm of Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hayes and Hadler ("Kaye, Scholer"), even multi-
million dollar insurance policies may be exhausted, leaving
partners personally liable for malpractice claims.2
* Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. This
article was written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of the Science of Law in the School of Law, Columbia University. The
author thanks Professors Curtis J. Berger and Harvey Goldschmid of Columbia
University School of Law for their insights.
1. Michael Orey, The Lessons of Kaye, Scholer: Am I My Partner's Keeper?,
AM. LAW., May 1992, at 3, 81.
2. In an unprecedented move on March 2, 1992, the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) sued Kaye, Scholer for $275 million and moved to freeze the
firm's assets. The OTS and the Justice Department claimed that Kaye, Scholer
attorneys participated in regulatory violations in the course of the firm's
representation of the now-defunct Lincoln Savings and Loan Association and
Lincoln's parent. OTS Freezes Kaye, Scholer's Assets, Asks For $275 Million in
Restitution, 58 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 419 (Mar. 9, 1992). Because the
firm's insurance carrier had already paid $20 million to settle securities and
racketeering lawsuits brought against it by investors who had purchased bonds
in Lincoln's parent company, Kaye, Scholer's insurance carrier only contributed
the remaining policy limits of $25 million to the settlement with the OTS. The
Kaye, Scholer partners had to personally pay the remaining $16 million due under
the OTS settlement agreement. Sharon Walsh, Top Lawyers Leave Kaye, Scholer;
OTS Lawsuit, Freeze on Assets Send Partners to Other Firms, WASH. POST, Sept.
19, 1992, at A8.
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Recognizing their vulnerability, law firm attorneys have
taken different steps to minimize their malpractice exposure.3
Some firm attorneys have begun to practice defensively,
adopting malpractice avoidance measures and instituting law
practice management programs.4 Other firm attorneys are
seeking shelter by converting their law partnership into a
professional corporation ("PC"), limited liability company
("LLC"),5 or limited liability partnership ("LLP").6 Through
3. Emily Couric, The Tangled Web: When Ethical Misconduct Becomes Legal
Liability, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1993, at 64, 64-65 (quoting Ronald Mallen, a California
malpractice defense lawyer and, according to Couric, considered by many as dean
of the malpractice bar: "'People didn't sue large law firms before because they
would fight'.. .. 'Now large law firms are seen as deep pockets.'"). To avoid being
a deep pocket and thus an inviting target, law firms are attempting to make their
pockets shallower by making changes in law firm structure. See Dennis E. Curtis,
Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Scholer, the Office of Thrift Supervision,
and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 985, 1014-15 (1993) (discussing
changes in law firm structure intended to lower liability exposure).
4. A survey of 101 chief administrators of the nation's largest law firms
revealed that 74% of the firms surveyed had already modified the way they
operate. Of the 74% of the firms that have made changes in operations, 63% of
the firms have implemented a new management structure. Firms Re-engineer:
Technology, Practice Areas Overhauled, A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 24, 24. For a
general description of the various prophylactic measures that firms may institute,
see Anthony E. Davis, Law Practice Management: Preventing Massive Money
Claims, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 12, 1992, at 1; Robert B. Yegge, Risk Management in Law
Practice: Produce, Protect & Satisfy, PRAC. LAW., Oct. 1993, at 25.
5. The first LLC legislation in the United States, enacted in Wyoming, does
not specifically address whether professionals may organize as LLCs. Although
the Maryland and Rhode Island statutes explicitly prohibit professionnals from
organizing as LLCs, the Alabama, Iowa, Kansas, Texas, Utah, and Virginia
statutes expressly allow professionals to operate as LLCs. Jimmy G. McLaughlin,
Comment, The Limited Liability Company: A Prime Choice for Professionals, 45
ALA. L. REV. 231, 244 (1993). In an LLC, individual members are liable for their
own misconduct. Id. at 245. An LLC provides members with the non-tax benefit
of limiting their personal liability, while providing the flow-through tax
advantages available in a general partnership. Sheldon I. Banoff & Burton W.
Kanter, LLC Announcements: Damage Control, 80 J. TAX'N 255, 255 (1994). In
regulating the practice of law, courts and regulators may refuse to recognize the
liability limitations. See Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability
Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375, 458 (1992)
(predicting that as part of the evolution of LLCs, the profession's regulators will
have to approve the LLC).
6. Texas was the first state to adopt legislation allowing for the registration
of limited liability partnerships, providing professionals with protection from
vicarious liability for malpractice and other torts. Under the Texas statute, TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15(2) (West Supp. 1993), partners in an LLP
are not liable for
errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance committed
in the course of the partnership business by another partner or a
representative of the partnership not working under the supervision or
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reorganization, attorneys seek to limit their vicarious liability.7
At the same time, an examination of banking regulators'
lawsuits against attorneys reveals that reorganization may not
provide an impervious shield to claims against nonparticipating
partners.8
In at least six such actions brought in connection with failed
savings and loan associations, the government has alleged that
each law firm partner is personally liable for failing to monitor
direction of the first partner at the time the errors, omissions, negligence,
incompetence, or malfeasance occurred, unless the first partner: (a) was
directly involved in the specific activity in which the errors, omissions,
negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance were committed by the other
partner or representative; or (b) had notice or knowledge of the errors,
omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance by the other partner
or representative at the time of occurrence.
Cf. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 1515(b) (1993) (stating that a partner in an LLP "is
not liable for debts and obligations of the partnership arising from negligence,
wrongful acts, or misconduct committed ... in the course of the partnership
business by another partner or an employee, agent or representative of the
partnership"). Each partner remains personally liable for his/her own malpractice
and jointly and severally liable for all other partnership obligations. Partnerships
remain liable for the torts of their partners and employees. The LLP structure
provides the tax advantages of a general partnership while affording its members
the benefits of corporate limited liability. David B. Rae, Limited Liability
Partnership:, The Time to Become One Is Now, HOUSTON LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at
47, 47.
7. The Texas and Louisiana LLP acts were motivated by the escalating
number of suits brought by the banking regulators against professionals who
performed services for financial institutions which later failed. Robert T. Bowsher,
RLLPs Can Limit a Partner's Personal Liability, 2 J. MULTISTATE TAX'N 232
(1992). In reaction to the aggressive efforts by banking regulators to target
attorneys, Louisiana enacted legislation to limit the liability of attorneys who
represent federally insured financial institutions. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:1351
(West Supp. 1994). The Louisiana law effectively limits the responsibility of
attorneys to that provided under the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct.
Louisiana Statute Sets Limits on Liability of Attorneys Who Represent
Banks/Thrifts, 57 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 172 (July 26, 1991); see also Christi
Harlan, Texas and Louisiana Move to Shield Personal Assets of Law Firm
Partners, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at A6.
8. The term "nonparticipating partner" refers to partners or principals who
did not participate in the alleged wrongdoing. Although the regulators' claims
against attorneys depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each case,
some general patterns emerge. One commentator identifies four recurring issues:
(1) participation in insider misconduct, (2) conflicts of interest and failure to
exercise independent judgment, (3) failure to monitor and supervise attorneys, and
(4) failure to protect depositors. Michelle D. Monse, Ethical Issues in Representing
Thrifts, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1992).
1995]
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the conduct of other firm partners.' The following claim
typifies the government's allegations:
The firm and its members further owed duties to [the institu-
tion] ... to detect and prevent the negligent breaches of
fiduciary duty and other acts of negligence described herein.
The firm and its members negligently failed to implement
such procedures and to properly monitor its members,
resulting in substantial harm to [the institution]. 10
This claim, characterized as a "failure to monitor" claim,
assumes that there is a recognized duty for attorneys to monitor
the conduct of their partners." In making such allegations,
the government has asserted that the failure to monitor claims
are distinct from the vicarious liability claims. 2 In a vicarious
liability claim, attorney-partners not directly involved in the
alleged acts or omissions are alleged to be vicariously liable for
the acts and omissions of their partners by virtue of the
principle of partnership law, which holds a partnership and its
members liable for the tortious wrong or contractual breach
committed by one partner within the scope of partnership
9. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 50, FDIC v. Wise, No. 90-F-1688
(D. Colo. filed Feb. 4, 1991) (alleging that Sherman & Howard attorneys "failed to
monitor properly and supervise the activities of Sherman & Howard partner Ron
Jacobs as counsel to Silverado [Savings & Loan Association]"); Amended
Complaint at 21, FDIC v. Bauman, No. CA3-90-614-H (N.D. Tex. filed June 14,
1990) (alleging that "[elach of the defendants individually owed a duty [to their
clients] to ensure that there were in effect measures giving reasonable assurance
that all attorneys in the firm conformed to required standards of care, and other
applicable ethical, professional and legal standards").
10. Complaint at 40, FSLIC v. Lensing, Gravel, Rosenzwig, Christen &
Lebeau, No. 89-329 (M.D. La. filed Apr. 23, 1989). Compare the more general
allegations in Plaintiffs Original Complaint at 41-42, FDIC v. Jones, Day, Reavis
& Pogue, No. 90 CA 925 (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 30, 1990) (alleging that one or more
of the partners at Jones, Day "[flailed to properly monitor and supervise attorneys
working on [bank] matters").
11. First Amended Complaint at 49, FDIC v. Wise, No. 90-F-1688 (D. Colo.
filed Feb. 4, 1991). Some pleadings merely state that firms have a responsibility
to monitor their lawyers" compliance with professional standards. See, e.g.,
Plaintiffs Original Complaint at 6-7, FDIC v. Nathan, No. H-91-2845 (S.D. Tex.
filed Sept. 25, 1991) (According to the government's pleadings, "[blecause of the
complexities inherent in the practice of law and the difficulties nonlawyers face
in determining who is a competent and ethical lawyer, law firms have the
responsibility of monitoring and maintaining their lawyers' compliance with high
professional standards.").
12. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 60-61, FDIC v. Eckert Seamans
Cherin & Mellott, No. CV 90-0488 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 1, 1990) (asserting a direct
negligence claim against an attorney for his failure to monitor another attorney
in the firm and for failing to discover the second attorney's misconduct).
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activities. The government differentiates its vicarious liability
claims from its failure to monitor claims by alleging that each
partner is personally liable for failing to monitor and supervise
other partners. By alleging a failure to monitor, the govern-
ment is attempting to convert a vicarious liability claim into a
direct liability claim. This reformulation has some practical
consequences.
First, the government may bypass the provisions in statutes
that allow professionals to limit their personal liability by
practicing in LLPs, LLCs, and PCs. Under some PC statutes,
attorneys in a PC are not personally liable for other sharehold-
ers' acts or omissions.'" Similarly, professionals in LLPs and
LLCs may be protected from vicarious liability claims. Al-
though an attorney in a PC, LLC or LLP may not be liable for
vicarious liability claims, the attorney is still liable for his or
her own negligence.' 4 By suing each attorney for his or her
own negligence in failing to monitor other attorneys, the
government is attempting to avoid the personal liability
limitations under PC, LLC, and LLP statutes.
15
Second, by alleging the failure to monitor claim as a direct
negligence claim, the government may avoid application of
certain exclusions under professional liability policies. For
example, professional liability policies typically exclude
coverage for dishonest, fraudulent, criminal, or malicious acts
(the "dishonesty exclusion").' 6 Unless the policy contains
13. David Paas, Professional Corporations and Attorney-Shareholders: The
Decline of Limited Liability, 11 J. CORP. L. 371, 374 (1986) (noting that the
Professional Corporations Supplement to the Model Business Corporation Act
recognizes that the approaches to vicarious liability used in various professional
corporation statutes were "remarkable in their diversity"). For a discussion of the
different variations and court interpretations, see Karen M. Maycheck, Comment,
Shareholder Liability in Professional Legal Corporations: A Survey of the States,
47 U. PI'T. L. REV. 817 (1986).
14. Under the PC statutes found in 12 states, each shareholder's personal
liability is limited to that shareholder's own acts or omissions. Maycheck, supra
note 13, at 822. In those states, a nonparticipating shareholder may not be
vicariously liable, but may be liable for his or her own negligence in failing to
monitor the alleged wrongdoer.
15. Banking regulators may also attack state liability limitations, asserting
that the courts should apply "federal common law." In O'Melveny v. Myers, 114
S. Ct. 2048, 2052-53 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected such an argument
in holding that in a state law negligence action, California law rather than federal
law governs imputation of corporate officers' knowledge of fraud to the corporation.
16. See, e.g., CNA, Lawyer's Insurance Coverage, Professional Liability
Policy, Exclusion II.D.3. (Feb., Sept. 1985) (stating that the policy does not apply
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provisions protecting innocent insureds who did not have
knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing, the dishonesty exclusion
could eliminate coverage for both the wrongdoer and other
partners who are vicariously liable. 7 On the other hand, the
dishonesty exclusion may not apply if the nonparticipating
partners are sued for failing to monitor the wrongdoer. The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached such a
conclusion in recognizing that such failure to supervise
allegations could be negligence or breach of duty claims which
do not fall under the dishonesty exclusion.' 8  Therefore, in
alleging a duty to monitor claim, a plaintiff may obtain recovery
that otherwise would be excluded.'9
Third, the failure to monitor claim may also enable the
government to recover proceeds under multiple professional
to "any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission") (on file with
the University of Col6rado Law Review).
17. Under the policy terms, the dishonesty exclusion may be waived for any
insured who did not personally participate in any fraudulent, criminal, or
dishonest conduct, or remain passive after having personal knowledge of such act
or omission. This waiver is commonly referred to as "innocent partner protection."
Such protection is important in states in which members of partnerships and PCs
share joint and several liability with other members in the firm. See Robert W.
Minto, Jr. & Marcia D. Morton, The Anatomy of Legal Malpractice Insurance: A
Comparative View, 64 N.D. L. REV. 547, 574 (1988) (discussing the case of Aragona
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Co., 378 A.2d 1346 (Md. 1977), in which the court held
that a professional liability policy without innocent partner protection did not
afford coverage where the insured's partner misappropriated escrow funds).
18. Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 1988). In Jensen, the
professional liability insurance policies each contained an exclusion for any
dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts or omissions of any insured,
partner, or employee. The insurers unsuccessfully argued that the exclusions
eliminated coverage for the wrongdoer and the firm because the fraudulent act of
the wrongdoer was imputed to the partnership. Id. at 614-15. CompareFDIC v.
Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546, 553 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991),
where the court concluded that the policy provision protecting innocent partners
did not apply because the jury had specifically found that the firm had breached
its fiduciary duty.
19. The failure to monitor claims could also avoid the application of a
number of other policy exclusions, including exclusions that eliminate coverage for
"intentional acts" and "business activities." For example, exclusion (H) in the
International Insurance Company's Lawyers Professional Liability Policy excludes
coverage for "any claim arising out of or in connection with the conduct of any
business enterprise ... which is owned by any Insured or in which any Insured
is a partner, or which is directly or indirectly controlled, operated or managed by
any Insured either individually or in a fiduciary capacity." For a discussion of the
exclusions most frequently encountered in a professional liability policy, see
Andrew S. Hanen & Jett Hanna, Legal Malpractice Insurance: Exclusions,
Selected Coverage and Consumer Issues, 33 S. TEX. L. REV. 75, 78-111 (1992).
AM I MY PARTNER'S KEEPER?
liability policies covering attorneys who leave the defendant law
firm and join new law firms which have their own claims-made
insurance policies. In one case, a federal district court ruled
that the new law firm's $15 million policy did not cover the
vicarious liability claims relating to an insured attorney's
former law firm.2" At the same time, the court ruled that the
new law firm's policy covered the direct liability claims which
alleged that the insured attorney negligently failed to monitor
his former partners at the defendant law firm.2
To date, the government has not had to prove its failure to
monitor claims. Nevertheless, the government's claims should
provoke serious consideration of the concept of peer review in
law firms. If attorneys have an affirmative duty to monitor
peers, then law firms' reorganizational efforts may not shield
them from liability for the acts or omissions of their peers. If,
on the other hand, courts determine that the duty to monitor
claim is nothing more than a disguised vicarious liability claim,
courts may conclude that the statutory limits on vicarious
liability protect professionals from personal liability for
wrongful acts committed by fellow professionals in the firm.22
After briefly reviewing perspectives on the emergence,
growth, and structure of law firms in part I, I use a matrix to
show how firm culture and organizational structure affect
internal and external controls on attorney conduct. Part II then
discusses the concept of law firm peer review, identifying its
goals and purposes. Part III considers whether law firm
principals have a legal duty to monitor their peers. In part IV,
I will capsulize the organized bar's initiatives relating to peer
review. Part V generally reviews types of law firm peer review.
Finally, part VI speculates on the future of peer review. As
20. Memorandum Opinion and Order, National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. FDIC,
No. CA3-90-0492 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 1991), appeal docketed, No. 91-1329 (5th Cir.
Apr. 1, 1991).
21. Id. at 14. The court did not address the merits of the government's duty
to monitor allegations because the only issue before the court was whether the
insurer had a duty to defend those claims in the underlying litigation. Id. at 11.
The underlying case was eventually settled.
22. For example, in FDIC v. Cocke, 7 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 53 (1994), the FDIC asserted that the claims against a
defendant-attorney were not derivative claims and, therefore, should not be barred
by Virginia's PC statute. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that
the statute exculpates shareholders for the negligent activities of other sharehold-
ers. Id. According to the court, the attorney could not be personally liable if he
was not personally responsible for any of the work done. Id.
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speculated, various approaches to peer review may emerge if
attorneys continue to limit their liability. Regulators may
require some form of peer review or courts may impose civil
liability if principals fail to monitor their peers. Such action
could be avoided if firms take the lead and institute peer review
programs in managing client service. Such an approach helps
protect the firm and its assets, as well as the consuming public,
resulting in a merger of good management and ethics.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF LAW FIRMS
A. Historical Perspective
In exploring the duty of an attorney to monitor his/her
partners, one must consider the reasons why attorneys band
together in a law firm. Historians, sociologists, and economists
have different perspectives relating to the emergence, growth,
and structure of large law firms.
Historians have treated the emergence of law firms as an
evolutionary process beginning with attorneys who practiced
law as individuals.2" In the first quarter of the nineteenth
century, some attorneys formed two person partnerships. By
the end of the century, these partnerships grew into firms with
more members.24 The membership continued to increase until
the 1930s when firms began to be called pejoratively "law
factories."25 Before the Second World War, the big firm had
come to dominate law practice.26 By the 1950s and 1960s
large firms had reached their "golden age" as prosperous,
stable, and untroubled institutions.2
For the next two decades firms continued to grow and
flourish.28 Firms expanded their practices, adding specialties
23. JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 306 (1950) (noting
that the typical partnership had a "court" member and an "office" member).
24. For statistics demonstrating the growth of law firms, see RICHARD L.
ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 182-83 (1989).
25. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 16-18 (1991) (attributing the term "law
factory" to Karl Llewellyn's book review published in 31 COLuM. L. REV. 1215,
1218 (1931) (reviewing MORRIS GISNET, A LAWYER TELLS THE TRUTH (1931)).
26. Id. at 20.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 46 (indicating that firms with more than 100 lawyers grew
from less than 12 in 1960 to 251 in 1986).
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and branch offices in the United States and abroad.29 By the
1980s the large law firms were sitting "atop 'the pyramid of
prestige and power within the American legal profession."3 °
Large firms represented the most affluent clients and attracted
the best trained and skilled attorneys."' In recent years, firms
have contended with increased competition, turmoil, declining
business and high overhead.32 Nevertheless, the large law
firm has achieved success in the Darwinian sense.3
B. Sociological and Economic Theories
Various sociological and economic theories have been used
to explain the structure and growth of firms. Case studies of
the early firms suggest that interpersonal relationships played
a significant role in institutional growth. 4 These studies
indicate that, at least initially, successful firms arose out of
interpersonal relationships where partners' skills and assets
complemented one another.35 Although such interpersonal
relationships cannot be ignored, the interpersonal approach
does not provide a complete explanation of the growth and
29. See id. at 47-48.
30. ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 1 (1988). In his book, Nelson uses an "organization
dominance" framework to explain how large law firms have achieved and
maintained a dominant position in the market for corporate legal services. Id. at
18-24.
31. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 25, at 50, 57.
32. See Daniel B. Kennedy, Cutbacks Profit Partners, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1994,
at 32 (reporting that a 1993 survey indicated that the largest firms were growing
at a "snail's pace" and attributing partner compensation increases to "internal cost
controls").
33. Marc Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The
Promotion-to-Partner Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L.
REv. 747, 748 (1990) (elaborating on how large law firms have successfully
commanded a larger market share and provided the standard format for the
"delivery of comprehensive, continuous, high-quality legal services").
34. See Thomas P. Pinansky, The Emergence of Law Firms in the American
Legal Profession, 9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 593, 598-604 (1986) (describing case
studies of Shearman & Sterling and Reed Smith Shaw & McClay, firms in New
York and Pittsburgh, respectively).
35. Id. For a discussion of the rough division of labor and specialties, see
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 311 (2d ed. 1985). Paul
D. Cravath, founder of the present Cravath, Swaine & Moore, is recognized as the
first person to set out deliberately to institutionalize a law firm as an entity that
would transcend and outlive the influence of individual partners. For a discussion
of Cravath's philosophy, see PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE GREAT WALL STREET LAW FIRMS 6-8 (1973).
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longevity of firms.3' Therefore, scholars advance other socio-
logical and economic explanations.
One such sociological explanation holds that large firms
have emerged as a functionally appropriate response to
structural-technological forces in American society.37 This
demand-side explanation contrasts with the supply-side
perspective which focuses on the entrepreneurial interests of
attorneys to organize in law firms in order to attract corporate
clients.38 In considering both internal and external factors,
the rise of organizational law practice can be attributed to the
"[e]conomies of scale, increasingly complex and geographically
expansive litigation, diverse client concerns, and the rapid
growth of corporate entities." 3s In short, size enables the firm
to meet the needs of both the clients and firm members.4
In analyzing the structure of law firms, economists have
characterized the law firm as an organization consisting of a
nexus of contracts between owners of factors of production and
customers.41 Economists explain that these contracts specify
agents' rights, performance standards, and payoffs.42 By
specifying payoffs as promised payments to agents, the contract
36. Pinansky, supra note 34, at 604 (suggesting that an effective analysis
must also consider the prevailing social conditions in which firms emerged).
37. See id. at 604-21 (discussing the five structural and technological
developments in the nineteenth century which contributed to the growth of firms:
"(1) the law changing to meet the developmental goals of 19th-century America;
(2) the rise of corporations and the response of government; (3) the expansion of
the field of finance; (4) technological change and an attendant ideology of science;
and (5) the changing conception of organizations").
38. Id. at 624 (applying Magali Sarfatti Larson's theory of collective mobility
conceptualized in her seminal work, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGI-
CAL ANALYSIS (1977)).
39. Colin Croft, Reconceptualizing American Legal Professionalism: A
Proposal for Deliberative Moral Community, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1256, 1288 (1992).
40. In economic terms, "[slize permits diversification while protecting
individual partners from the threat that their human capital will depreciate if
their specialty becomes obsolete." ABEL, supra note 24, at 183.
41. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302 (1983). Under this theory of organization, each
individual contributes factors of production to a cooperative enterprise in order to
achieve greater returns than the individual would receive independently. Ronald
J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37
STAN. L. REV. 313, 332 (1985).
42. Fama & Jensen, supra note 41, at 302.
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structure of the organization limits the agents' risks.4 In law
firms, attorneys as agents of the firm offer inalienable human
capital and perform services for clients." In exchange, the
attorney-agents have residual claims against the firm's net cash
flow.45
Under this economic model, monitoring plays an important
role in law firms. Monitoring minimizes the risk of a partner
taking a free-ride on the efforts of colleagues and protects the
firm and its members from the acts or omissions of incompetent
or malfeasant partners.46 Monitoring also helps maintain the
value of human capital which is sensitive to the performance of
agents.47 In order to avoid shirking by partners (agents),
while controlling liability and protecting reputational capital,
firms monitor the performance of firm attorneys.'
In the case of law partnerships, this monitoring must be
provided by attorneys because of the asymmetry between the
knowledge possessed by the attorney-professionals and the
client-consumers.49 Commonly, senior attorneys act as moni-
tors in supervising associates and screening associates before
inviting the associates to join the partnership ranks. During
this screening period, partners closely evaluate associates'
work-product and behavior.0 To assure maximum effort by
43. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual
Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 328 (1983) (characterizing the organization's agents
as residual claimants or residual risk bearers).
44. Id. at 336-37 (asserting that this professional human capital which
cannot be sold to cover liability losses to customers is the dominant asset of a
professional partnership).
45. Id. at 334.
46. Under the principles of partnership law, partners in firms share
unlimited liability for the acts or omissions of partners in the scope of partnership
business. For a discussion of partnership principles, see infra part III.A.
47. Fama & Jensen, supra note 43, at 334-35.
48. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 41, at 380-81 (asserting that partners
who share compensation on a seniority basis can minimize shirking problems by
employing monitoring techniques and by developing a "supportive firm culture").
49. In the case of large corporate clients, in-house counsel and consultants
may monitor some performance. For example, in-house counsel and legal
consulting firms can scrutinize billing statements for irregularities. See Darlene
Ricker, Auditing Lawyers for a Living, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 65 (discussing the
trend of clients to hire consultants to audit legal bills). In analyzing the role of
outside counsel in changing the demand side of the legal marketplace, Professors
Gilson and Mnookin suggest that the sophistication of outside counsel will reduce
the value of firm-specific capital which depends on high information costs and
unsophisticated clients. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 41, at 384.
50. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 25, at 99.
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associates, firms defer a significant amount of compensation to
the outcome of the "promotion to partner tournament."51 After
the tournament winners cross the line and receive the trophy
of partnership status, their work is no longer continuously
monitored because they have attained peer status.
C. Culture and Organizational Structure of Law Firms
The degree to which law firm principals monitor or review
their peers depends on a number of factors including the firm's
culture and organizational structure. A firm's culture may fall
somewhere on a continuum between a "confederation" culture
and a "team" culture at the opposite end.52
At one end of the continuum attorneys function as loose
confederations of individuals, rather than as organized
teams.53 In a confederation culture, each attorney practices
independently as a "master of his or her craft," essentially
functioning as an individual practitioner sharing offices with
others.54 These attorneys perceive peer review as a threat to
autonomy because they prefer to practice with little supervision
or accountability.55
In contrast, attorneys who function as teams emphasize firm
practice as a joint effort to serve firm clients.5" Attorneys in
a team firm seek to represent clients as a single entity, rather
than as a collection of individuals.5" This team approach
requires the subordination of individual attorneys' interests to
the firm's interests.58 In setting firm-wide standards, team
51. Id. at 100-08 (theorizing that the promotion to partner tournament
propels exponential growth of law firms).
52. See ALTMAN & WEIL, INC., COMPENSATION PLANS FOR LAWYERS AND
THEIR STAFFS: SALARIES, BONUSES AND PROFIT-SHARING 6-8 (1986) (characterizing
these attitudes toward group practice).
53. Id. at 6-7.
54. Id. at 7 (explaining that the office exists merely to facilitate each
lawyer's practice providing staff support, a library, amenities, coverage during
absence or illness, and companionship).
55. See id. (noting that the attorneys enjoy the sense of independence and
the lack of accountability that the confederation culture allows).
56. Id. at 7 (explaining that in a team firm, clients "belong" to the firm
rather than to any individual partner).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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firms lay the foundation for using peer review to manage firm
members. 59
The organizational structure of a firm also affects attitudes
toward peer review. If a firm is organized as a general
partnership in which partners have unlimited liability, peer
review helps firms avoid malpractice, thus limiting the liability
exposure of the firm and individual partners. In such a general
partnership, peer review acts as an internal control, while
liability exposure acts as an external control.
On the other hand, if a firm is organized as a PC, LLP, or
LLC (collectively called "limited liability firms"), a principal's
liability may be limited to claims arising out of that principal's
own acts or omissions. Because the firm's assets and reputation
are at stake, principals in limited liability firms may monitor
other members to prevent malpractice. More commonly,
principals in such firms may avoid monitoring or reviewing
another attorney's work because the act of monitoring may
destroy the liability protection which is only afforded to
nonparticipating partners. 60  This acts as a disincentive to
attorneys reviewing the work of other members of the limited
liability firm. Rather than risk the possibility of liability
exposure for a colleague's conduct, a principal may choose to
avoid any involvement, deliberately shutting his or her eyes.6'
59. Attorneys function more like a team when they share common
aspirations and interests. Lon Fuller used this principle of shared commitment
to explain human associations. Lon L. Fuller, Two Principles of Human
Association, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 67, 70-76 (Kenneth I. Winston
ed., 1981) (contrasting the principle of shared commitment with the opposing legal
principle of associations held together by formal rules of duty and entitlement).
60. For example, the Texas statute identifies the following situations when
the LLP provisions will not shield a partner from vicarious liability: (1) the
miscreant partner or representative is working under the supervision or direction
of the partner; (2) the partner was "directly involved in the specific activity in
which the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance were
committed by the other partner or representative"; or (3) the partner "had notice
or knowledge of the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance
by the other partner or representative at the time of occurrence" and then failed
to take reasonable steps to prevent or cure the wrongdoing. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 6132b, § 15(2) (West Supp. 1995). In an attempt to limit their liability
under these sections, partners may intentionally avoid any direct involvement or
peer review which might charge them with notice or knowledge of other partners'
misconduct.
61. Such abdication of responsibility could be discouraged if an attorney
whose conduct rises to the level of reckless disregard is deemed to have knowledge
of the wrongdoing. Federal courts have used a similar approach in holding that
scienter can be predicated on reckless conduct for liability under § 10(b) of the
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In this event, neither internal peer review nor external
unlimited liability protects clients.
In considering both the firm culture, as well as firm
organizational structure, one can further analyze the extent to
which clients and firm attorneys can be protected by internal
peer review controls and external controls of unlimited liability.
The following matrix illustrates the interplay of internal and
external controls in law firms with different cultures and
organizational structures.
LAW FIRM STRUCTURE
GENERAL LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY
FIRM
TEAM
CULTURE
CONFEDER-
ATION
CULTURE
In quadrant I, firm partners operate as a team and engage
in some degree of peer review. This peer review protects both
the clients and partners from the consequences of malfeasant
partners. At the same time, the unlimited liability of partners
in a general partnership protects clients in the event of a claim.
Firms in quadrant II organize as limited liability firms
rather than general partnerships. Nevertheless, partners may
take a team approach, using peer review to protect both the
clients and members of the firm. Unless a firm principal
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988), and Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994). See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d
1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that conduct is deemed sufficiently reckless to
constitute scienter if that conduct represents "an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger.., either known to the
defendant or so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it") (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1991).
I II
PEER REVIEW PEER REVIEW
& UNLIMITED & LIMITED
LIABILITY LIABILITY
III IV
NO PEER REVIEW NO PEER REVIEW
& UNLIMITED & LIMITED
LIABILITY LIABILITY
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directly participates in the delivery of legal services, or acts as
a monitor, that principal should not have vicarious liability if
courts recognize the statutory limits on liability of principals in
a limited liability firm.
The firms in quadrants III and IV operate as confederations.
In confederated firms, there is no peer review to protect either
clients or firm principals., In quadrant III, the unlimited
liability of the general partnership protects clients. At the
same time, attorneys experience the most exposure in quadrant
III because they must share the risks of unlimited liability,
with no peer review to control those risks.
Clients have the least protection in quadrant IV, when
confederations of attorneys organize as limited liability firms
and resist any form of peer review. As a result, in quadrant IV,
neither peer review nor unlimited liability controls peer
misconduct, thereby leaving clients completely unprotected.
In short, the peer review and unlimited liability exposure in
quadrant I provide the most protection for clients. At the other
extreme, clients obtain the least protection in quadrant IV
where the firm attorneys have limited liability and no form of
peer review. Attorneys in quadrant II seek to limit their
liability by organizing as limited liability firms and by institut-
ing some, form of peer review.2 Finally, the attorneys in
quadrant III share the most exposure as general partners in a
confederation firm with no peer review.
During the last few years, many attorneys have moved their
firms into quadrant IV."3 In doing so, attorneys are relying on
62. Notwithstanding the fact that they may not have vicarious liability,
attorneys in quadrant II may use peer review to protect the firm's assets and
reputation.
63. Richard C. Reuben, Added Protection, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1994, at 54
(discussing the rush of firms to reorganize as limited liability firms). In
characterizing limited liability firms as "clearly the hottest topic in the law today,
at least when it comes to practice management," Robert R. Keatinge, the chairman
of the ABA Business Law Section Partnership Committee's Subcommittee on
LLCs, stated that every law firm in the country is probably looking at limiting
liability. Id. at 55-56.
Prior to the enactment of legislation providing limited liability status to LLPs
and LLCs, Frank G. Mathewson and Jack L. Carr analyzed 1972 to 1977 census
data to compare firm size to liability status. Ronald J. Gilson, Unlimited Liability
and Law Firm Organization: Tax Factors and the Direction of Causation, 99 J.
POL. ECON. 420, 421 (1991). They concluded that a change in liability status
through incorporation significantly increases the average firm size. Id. In
criticizing this conclusion for failing to take into account the institutional setting
in which the change occurred, Professor Ronald J. Gilson analyzed the tax
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statutory liability limits rather than peer review controls. The
following discussion suggests reasons why these firms-and, in
fact, all firms-should revisit implementing peer review.
II. THE CONCEPT OF LAW FIRM PEER REVIEW
In law practice, "peer review" refers to a spectrum of
concepts. 64 For the purposes of this article, "law firm peer
review" means the process in which law firm partners or
principals monitor and evaluate the job performance of their
colleagues.65 Firms may design peer review programs to
obtain information for assessment and improvement of partners'
work.66
Law firm peer review serves a number of purposes. First,
partners can use peer review to assess colleagues' performances
prior to the delivery of the legal services. Such performance
assessment allows ex ante regulation of the quality of services.
Ex ante regulation helps partners control and possibly enhance
advantages of incorporating. Id. This analysis indicated that better economic
performance caused firms to incorporate to obtain tax benefits. Id. at 423-24.
According to Professor Gilson, successful firms are more likely to incorporate for
tax reasons than limited liability reasons. Id. Other factors may now be
influencing firms' decisions to reorganize as LLPs or LLCs. For example,
multistate firms may elect LLP status rather than PC status because most states
require that all PC members be licensed in the state of incorporation. McLaugh-
lin, supra note 5, at 259. A firm may elect LLP status to avoid state franchise
taxes payable by corporations. For a comparison of LLPs and LLCs, see Byron F.
Egan, LLC's and LLP's: Practical Considerations About Limited Liability
Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships, in UNIVERSITY OF HoUs. L.
FOUND., CORPORATE, PARTNERSHIP AND BUSINESS LAW INSTITUTE, at D-1 (1994).
64. The spectrum of proposals for peer review ranges from lawyer to lawyer
individual help, through law practice peer review, to disciplinary peer review. For
a discussion of the range of proposals, see A.L.I.-A.B.A. COMM. ON CONTINUING
PROF. EDUC., ENHANCING THE COMPETENCE OF LAWYERS 255-63 (1981).
65. This article uses "partner" or "principal" to denote any equity holder in
a firm, including a partner of a partnership and shareholder in a professional
corporation. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct take a similar
approach, defining a "partner" to be "a member of a partnership and shareholder
in a law firm organized as a professional corporation." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
66. Harry H. Schneider, Jr., Your Partner's Keeper, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at
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the quality of legal services rendered.67 Clearly, such regula-
tion protects clients and a firm's relationships with clients.
Second, peer review can operate as a risk management
program to reduce the likelihood of malpractice claims and
grievances. Specifically, peer review may eliminate grievances
and claims arising out of errors or omissions by individual
partners. By instituting a peer review program, partners may
also avoid violations of state disciplinary rules that are based
on Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.1(a), requiring
that partners make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm
has effectuated measures giving reasonable assurance that all
attorneys in the firm conform to the rules of professional
conduct.68
Firms may also institute a peer review program because a
particular state may not recognize statutory limits on liabili-
ty.6" When a firm's practice spans multiple states, the liability
limitations in one state may not provide protection in other
states." Rather than relying only on liability limits, partners
in multistate firms may attempt to lower their liability
exposure by instituting peer review.
In the event of a suit, peer review efforts would enable the
defendant partners to defend those legal malpractice claims
alleging a duty to monitor. Diligent peer review could defeat
67. This ex ante regulation of professional norms compares with other
enforcement strategies, including disciplinary and liability controls, which operate
on the basis of ex post complaints by injured parties. David Wilkins, Who Should
Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 807 (1992). For an analysis of all four
paradigmatic models of enforcement systems and the inadequacy of disciplinary
and liability schemes which largely depend on ex post complaints, see id. at 805-
07.
68. For a discussion of Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.1(a), see
infra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
69. For an examination of the states which have abolished limited liability
under professional corporation statutes, see Paas, supra note 13, at 375-83.
70. Given that states differ widely, the limitation of liability under the laws
of one state may not provide any protection in another state where the law firm
practices. First, a firm must determine if a foreign professional corporation can
qualify to do business in all states of practice. Then, the firm must determine if
the courts in particular states of practice have upheld statutory liability limits.
Problems arise when some firm members have limited liability and others do not.
As one legal malpractice defense counsel explained, "the 'worst of all possible
worlds' is a law firm where some lawyers do business as professional corporations
and others do not, leaving those without PC protection as vulnerable targets."
Saundra Torry, More Firms Searching for Ways to Limit Partners' Liability, WASH.
POST, May 11, 1992, at F5.
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the plaintiff's claims that the nonparticipant failed to monitor
the alleged wrongdoer.
Peer review also provides a mechanism for reexamining the
competency of all attorneys on a continuing basis.7' Such
reexamination is important because, as malpractice statistics
reveal, senior partners cause problems more than associates or
nonlawyers. 7 Periodic peer review may empower firm man-
agement to detect and deal with senior partners who are
incapacitated or incompetent.73
The peer review process can also boost intra-firm communi-
cation and identify serious problems, including partners'
substance abuse and other physical and mental problems
affecting attorney performance.74 Peer review may uncover
such problems before they pose a serious risk to the law
firm. 75
A peer review program can also serve marketing purposes.
A law firm's commitment to maintain and enhance quality
through peer review should impress prospective and current
clients. In particular, sophisticated corporate clients whose
companies have instituted total quality management ("TQM")
71. Because of the hierarchy in firms, peer review provides a vehicle for
holding partners accountable. The importance of monitoring the conduct of senior
attorneys was illustrated by the recent withdrawal of the respected managing
partner of the Chicago firm of Winston & Strawn, following financial irregularities
amounting to approximately $500,000. Stephanie B. Goldberg, An Unexpected
Ouster, A.B.A. J., July 1994, at 28. In another instance where Minneapolis based
Moss & Barnett's president embezzled $220,000, a firm partner stated, "[W]hen
the chief executive officer and head of the firm decides to do something, it takes
a strong-willed subordinate to say no to him." Id. at 28. If all firm attorneys must
comply with internal control measures, financial irregularities could be detected.
72. The Eighth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 133 F.R.D. 245, 287 (1990). In a speech presented
at the Eighth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, Robert E. O'Malley, one of the founders of the Attorneys
Liability Assurance Society, underscored that senior partners are the problem. Id.
O'Malley reported that of 300 malpractice claims seeking one million or more in
damages, not one claim arose out of the acts or omissions of an associate or young
partner. Id.
73. See Timothy G. Shelton, What Happens When Aging Lawyers Don't
Know When to Quit?, L. PRAC. MGMT., July-Aug. 1992, at 40, 42 (recommending
peer review as a means of dealing with incapacitation among elderly attorneys).
Although peer review should cover all attorneys, the review can be tailored to each
attorney's practice area.
74. Scott Graham, Four Divergent Approaches to Peer Review, RECORDER,
May 24, 1991, at 5.
75. Id.
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programs may be inclined to retain law firms that have
instituted peer review as part of a program of quality control."6
In the legal marketplace, a prospective client's decision to
retain a firm typically rests on the firm's reputation. For
example, an issuer of securities may retain the services of a
prestigious law firm so that the firm's national reputation is
associated with the offering. Similarly, clients may pay higher
fees for a tax opinion that bears the name of a reputable firm
which presumably has quality controls. Peer review efforts
operate as an investment in reputation or brand name capi-
tal.77 By investing time and resources in peer review, firms
signal to outsiders "their commitment not to shirk."" At the
same time, within the firm, peer review acts as a prophylaxis
to shirking.
In addition to improving individual performance and
conduct, peer review helps shape attorneys' perspectives of the
law firm as a team, rather than a confederation of individual
attorneys practicing together in the same office. In a team
firm, the clients appear to belong to the firm, 'rather than to
individual attorneys. If active monitoring prevents a partner
from becoming too autonomous, peer review may minimize the
risks of partners grabbing clients and leaving the firm.79
76., Corporate America has followed the lead of Japanese and European
industrialists in embracing TQM programs to assure consistent performance.
Gary R. Garrett, What Does Total Quality Management Mean for Legal Organiza-
tions?, LEGAL MGMT., May-June 1992, at 20. It was predicted that by 1994, an
estimated 80% of corporate law departments of Fortune 500 companies would have
implemented TQM programs. Ward Bower, In Search of Excellence-Applying
TQM to a Legal Environment, L. PRAc. MGMT., Apr. 1993, at 22. These corporate
clients would be positively impressed by a law firm's efforts to assure quality
through a partner review program. As revealed by a survey of Fortune 500
general counsel, 71% of the attorneys polled indicated that their selection of
outside counsel would be influenced by a firm's implementation of a TQM
program. Nancy Blodgett, More and More Law Firms Take the TQM Plunge,
LEGAL MGMT., May-June 1993, at 25.
77. In economic terms, the law firm essentially rents its reputation to its
clients.
78. See Jack Carr & Frank Mathewson, The Economics of Law Firms: A
Study in the Legal Organization of the Firm, 33 J.L. & ECON. 307, 311 (1990)
(explaining that the investment in brand name capital includes advertising,
expenses associated with the solicitation of new clients, accumulation of satisfied
clients, and fulfillment of commitments, including the punishment of chiselers).
79. For a thorough analysis of the problems of grabbing and leaving, see
Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of
Grabbing and Leaving, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1988).
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Finally, a peer review program can foster a positive law firm
culture where all attorneys are accountable. In such a culture,
ethical, competent performance merits recognition.8" A peer
review program communicates to persons inside and outside the
law firm that the firm is committed to providing quality legal
services.
III. Do MEMBERS OF LAW FIRMS HAVE A DUTY TO MONITOR
THEIR PEERS?
Regardless of the value of a peer review program, few
attorneys would concur with the premise that law firm partners
have a duty to monitor their peers. The government's pleadings
generally allege the existence of such a duty without identifying
the source of the duty.8' Therefore, various sources of law
must be consulted in considering whether firm members or
principals have a duty to monitor their peers.
A. Partnership Law
Because law firms traditionally function as general partner-
ships, one must first determine if partnership law imposes such
a duty. The rights, duties, and liabilities of partners in general
partnerships are defined in the Uniform Partnership Act
("UPA"'),s as adopted in most jurisdictions, and in the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA").83 Under the UPA, all
partners share an equal right in the management and conduct
80. See MODEL RULES Rule 5.1 cmt. (explaining that the "ethical atmosphere
of a firm influences the conduct of all its members").
81. See, e.g., Complaint, FSLIC v. Lensing, Gravel, Rosenzweig, Christen &
Lebeau, No. 89-329 (M.D. La. filed Apr. 23, 1989); see also Plaintiffs Original
Complaint, FDIC v. Nathan, No. H-91-2845 (S.D. Tex. filed Sept. 25, 1991); First
Amended Complaint, FDIC v. Wise, No. 90-F-1688 (D. Colo. fied Feb. 4, 1991).
82. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (1914) [hereinafter UPA].
83. REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (1993) [hereinafter RUPA]. In August
1993, the final revisions to the RUPA were approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson,
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporters' Overview, 49 BUs. LAW. 1,
1 n.1 (1993). Dean Donald J. Weidner and Professor John W. Larson served as
reporters for RUPA. For their analysis of the principal changes made by the
RUPA, see id. at 1. Unlike the UPA which does not settle whether a partnership
should be characterized as an "aggregate" of its partners, or a distinct legal entity,
RUPA specifically states that partnerships are entities. Id. at 3 (RUPA § 201).
Within a year of the National Conference of Commissioners' approval, Montana
and Wyoming adopted the RUPA. Id. at 1 n. 1.
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of partnership business.84 Although the UPA recognizes a
right of a partner to participate in the management and
conduct of the partnership, the UPA does not actually impose
a duty on a partner to participate in management or to monitor
the conduct of other partners.
At the same time, the UPA's liability provisions do provide
incentives for partners to monitor each other because both the
firm and its partners may be liable for the acts or omissions of
partners.85 This liability on the firm level and individual
partner level encourages partners to monitor and control
unethical activity.
86
First, the partnership itself is subject to tort liability for the
acts or omissions of a partner. Section 13 of the UPA provides
that the partnership is liable for loss or injury caused "to any
person, not being a partner," for "any wrongful act or omission
of any partner acting in the ordinary course of partnership
business or with the authority of the co-partners." v Under
this section, which codifies common law,88 the partnership is
ordinarily liable for a tort committed by one of the members
acting within the scope of the firm's business, even though the
84. Under UPA § 18 "all partners have equal rights in the management and
conduct of the partnership business" unless an agreement provides to the contrary.
ALAN BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBsTEIN, PARTNERSHIP § 6.03, at 6:38 (1994). Under
the terms of the partnership agreement, partners may concentrate management
power in one or more managing partners. Id. § 6.03, at 6:39-40 (explaining that
professional partnerships commonly rely on managing partners because there are
too many members to permit all to participate effectively in daily decision-
making). Normally, the partnership agreement will identify categories of
management decisions that must be made by the members and other limits on the
managing partner's decision-making authority.
85. See UPA § 13.
86. Jeffrey A. Barker, Professional-Client Sex: Is Criminal Liability an
Appropriate Means of Enforcing Professional Responsibility?, 40 UCLA L. REV.
1275, 1316 n.164 (1993). For cases imposing liability for the negligence of an
innocent partner in the event of fraudulent activities by another partner, see id.
87. UPA § 13. Although this language covers negligent acts of partners,
some question remains as to whether nonparticipating partners may be liable for
wrongdoing which requires a high level of culpability. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN,
supra note 84, § 4.07, at 4:78.
88. The common law principle as articulated in Filter v. Meyer, 41 S.W. 152
(Tex. Civ. App. 1897), states:
Every member of an ordinary partnership is its general agent for the
transaction of its business in the ordinary way; and the firm is responsi-
ble for whatever is done by any of the partners when acting for the firm
within the limits of the authority conferred by the nature of its business
it carries on.
Id. at 153 (quoting 1 NATHANIEL LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIP 256-57 (1888)).
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persons sought to be charged did not participate in, ratify, or
have knowledge of such conduct.89
Second, under the UPA, each member of the partnership is
liable for all partnership debts and obligations, including those
arising from wrongful acts or omissions of a partner or from
breaches of trust chargeable to the firm.9" Under the UPA, a
partner who has not participated in or condoned the wrongful
actions of another partner may still be vicariously liable for the
acts or omissions of other partners.91 Partners may also be
vicariously liable under agency and respondeat superior
principles.92
Partnership tort liability imposes losses on the party who
can most efficiently control misconduct.93 A partnership and
its partners may reduce the risks of wrongdoing by effectively
89. In order for a nonparticipating partner to be personally liable for the
wrongful, tortious, or criminal acts of another partner, the act must fall within the
scope of the partnership business or the nonparticipating partner must ratify,
authorize, or adopt the acts or omissions. K & G Oil & Tool Serv. Co. v. G & G
Fishing Tool Serv., 314 S.W.2d 782, 793 (Tex. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898
(1958).
90. Under UPA § 15(a), partners are "Ulointly and severally liable for
everything chargeable to the partnership under" UPA§ 13 (covering wrongful acts
and omissions) and UPA § 14 (covering breaches of trust). Under UPA § 15(b)
partners are jointly liable "for all other partnership debts and obligations." For
an analysis of the procedural differences between "joint" and "joint and several"
liability, see Alan R. Bromberg, Enforcement of Partnership Obligations-Who Is
Sued for the Partnership?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 143, 146 (1992). Unlike the UPA which
differentiates between tort and contract liability, the RUPA imposes on partners
joint and several liability for all partnership obligations. RUPA § 306 cmt.91. See J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Vicarious Liability of Attorney for Tort of
Partners in Law Firm, 70 A.L.R. 3d 1298 (1976) (surveying case law on an
attorney's liability for partners' torts).
92. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 84, § 4.07, at 4:80 n.8 (citing
cases applying respondeat superior and agency principles). Under § 9(1) of the
UPA, "the partnership is bound by the torts of a partner in the 'ordinary course
of the business' without other proof that the partner was acting as a servant of the
partnership." Id. § 4.07, at 4:79.
93. Id. § 4.07, at 4:78 (explaining that the ability of a partnership to reduce
the costs of partners' acts depends on "how closely. the loss relates to partnership
business, because this bears on the partnership's costs of obtaining information
about the risk and of implementing risk avoidance procedures, including those
regarding the selection and supervision of partners").
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monitoring its agents.94 The risk of vicarious liability provides
a powerful incentive for partners to monitor each other.95
A survey of malpractice case law indicates that most cases
against nonparticipating partners turn on vicarious liability
principles. Occasionally, plaintiffs have asserted a direct
negligence claim alleging failure to monitor and supervise the
malpracticing partner.9" For example, in Myers v. Aragona, v
the plaintiff alleged a vicarious liability claim, as well as an
independent negligence claim. The plaintiff asserted that the
nonparticipating partner "failed to inspect books of account and
other financial records of the partnership, and further that he
failed to make inquiry as to the application of the... funds or
to familiarize himself with the transactions carried on by his
law partner."9" Because the court determined that the nonpar-
ticipating partner was vicariously liable under the UPA, the
court concluded that it was unnecessary to consider the direct
liability claim.99 As stated by the court, because of the vicari-
ous liability law of partnerships, any discussion of the direct
liability claim is "purely academic."' °
94. Presumably, a partner implicitly agrees to be subject to the risks of
partnership in return for the ability to monitor and control the activities of other
partners. See Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65
WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 405 (1987) (asserting that a disabled partner or estate should
have a right of unpenalized withdrawal because the disabled partner or partner's
estate does not have control over other partners' activities and should not remain
exposed to partnership risks).
95. See Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of
Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAw. 427, 468 (1991) (arguing that the
allocation of risk of loss inside the partnership is not necessary in order to
encourage either good performance or good monitoring).
96. See, e.g., Dollman v. Shutts & Bowen, 575 So. 2d 320, 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment for
defendant attorney and the firm). Jurisdictions vary on whether the partnership
may be sued as an entity or whether each partner must be sued individually. 1
RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 5.3, at 51 (3d ed.
1989 & Supp. 1993). For example, under Texas.law individual partners will not
be personally liable for the judgment unless they are actually served as parties.
TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.003 (West 1994).
97. 318 A.2d 263, 264 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
98. Id. at 266. The plaintiff also asserted that the nonparticipating partner
failed to discover the other partner's misappropriation. Id.
99. Id. at 269.
100. Id. In the subsequent insurance coverage case, the Maryland Court of
Appeals concluded that the policy's dishonesty provision excluded coverage for all
firm partners. Aragona v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 378 A.2d 1346 (Md.
1977). For a note on the insurance case, see Minto & Morton, supra note 17.
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Those few malpractice cases that actually discuss the failure
to monitor claim appear to turn on the professional responsibili-
ty of attorneys as third-party fiduciaries.' 1 Unlike ordinary
commercial partnerships, a legal partnership and its members
owe fiduciary obligations to clients. As articulated by Justice
Cardozo, a fiduciary must uphold a standard "stricter than the
morals of the marketplace[, n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor" most high.
10 2
A client retaining a partner in a firm retains the entire
firm.'03 Once retained, the firm and its members owe fiducia-
ry obligations to the clients. In the case of Blackmon v.
Hale,' 4 the California Supreme Court focused on an attor-
ney's fiduciary duties, reasoning that partners in a law firm are
co-trustees of clients' funds deposited in the firm's trust
account. While recognizing that a co-trustee is not strictly
liable for the wrongful acts of a co-fiduciary, the court concluded
that the nonparticipating partner must exercise reasonable
supervision over the other partners' conduct in relation to the
trust property.105 "Negligent inattention" to his duties ren-
dered the partner liable, notwithstanding the fact that he did
not actually participate in the misapplication of client
funds. 106
Similarly, in Dresser Industries v. Digges, 1 7 a federal
101. See infra text accompanying notes 104-08. Similarly, the liability of a
medical partnership may turn on its professional obligations to its patients. Cf
Kelsey-Seybold Clinic v. Maclay, 466 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1971). The court recognized
that a medical partnership is under a duty to exercise ordinary care to protect its
patients from harm resulting from tortious conduct of persons upon the premises.
Id. at 720. The court also noted that the clinic was under a duty to use reasonable
means to prevent a partner from misusing his position with the clinic. Id. If the
clinic failed to exercise ordinary care, it could be liable for its negligence. Id.
102. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (recognizing
fiduciary duties of "co-adventurers" in a business enterprise).
103. Once a client retains the firm, any firm attorney can perform -legal
services absent an agreement to the contrary. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 96,
§ 5.3, at 266; Stephen E. Kalish, The Sale of a Law Practice: The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Point in a New Direction, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471, 491-92
(1985) (arguing that in hiring the firm, the client expects that the particular
partner he hires will monitor other partners working on his case).
104. 463 P.2d 418 (Cal. 1970).
105. Id. at 424.
106. Id. at 424-25.
107. No. JH-89-485, 1989 WL 139234 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 1989). Dresser
retained the law firm of Digges, Wharton and Levin. When Dresser discovered
that Digges charged for services and expenses that were never performed or
incurred, Dresser sued the firm and its partners, alleging fraud, breach of
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district court predicated liability on a theory of negligent
supervision. In that case, Dresser alleged that nonparticipating
partners were vicariously liable because of their partnership
with Digges, the partner who engaged in improper billing
practices. In addition, Dresser alleged that the nonparticipat-
ing partners were independently liable for failing to monitor or
supervise Digges' billing practices. In granting summary
judgment against the nonparticipating partners, the court relied
on the affidavit of an expert witness who opined that a partner
in a law firm owes a duty to all clients to ensure that the law
firm has measures in effect which give reasonable assurance
that "all attorneys in the firm conform to the rules and
standards of professional conduct."'
B. Disciplinary Cases and Rules
Several reported disciplinary cases have based professional
misconduct on the respondent attorney's failure to supervise
law office operations.' °9 As noted by the court in In re Nei-
mark," for example, an attorney may and should be disci-
plined for his own carelessness and failure to adequately
supervise the operations of his office."' Although the disci-
plinary rules do not define standards for civil liability, the rules
fiduciary duty, breach of contract and negligence.
108. Id. at *8. In his deposition, a defendant attorney admitted that the
firm operated without any system or checkpoints which would reveal dishonest
acts or breaches of ethics by members of the firm. Id. at *7. The failure to have
any system or checkpoints could have been viewed as a violation of Maryland Rule
of Professional Conduct 5.1, which requires partners "make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all
lawyers in the firm conform to the rules of professional conduct." MD. CODE ANN.
app. MD. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 (Supp. 1994). This
rule is based on Model Rule 5.1 discussed infra notes 117-29 and accompanying
text.
109. See, e.g., In re Kiley, 256 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965)
(sustaining professional misconduct charges because the respondent failed to
uncover irregularities in firm billings and reports).
110. 214 N.Y.S.2d 12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961).
111. Id. at 13. The Neimark opinion does not specifically identify the
disciplinary rule that the respondent violated. The New York disciplinary rules
limit the responsibilities of a supervisory lawyer, stating that a lawyer shall be
responsible for a violation of the disciplinary rules by another lawyer if (1) the
lawyer orders the conduct; or (2) the lawyer has supervisory authority over the
other lawyer and knows or should have known of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated, but failed to take reasonable remedial
action. N.Y. Disciplinary Rule DR 1-104, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22,
§ 1200.5 (1994).
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may indicate some evidence of the applicable standard of
care. 112  Using this approach, a court might examine the
applicable disciplinary rules to determine the extent to which
they impose a duty to monitor peers.
No provision of the Model Code of Professional Responsibili-
ty ("Model Code")"' even tangentially addresses the question
of whether attorneys have a duty to supervise or monitor
another attorney's conduct. 114  Although the Model Code
mentions law firms in various provisions, the Model Code
focuses on attorneys as individual practitioners, largely ignoring
the professional responsibility of attorneys practicing in
entities." 5  The Model Code treats a law firm simply as an
environment within which the individual attorney operates."
6
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules")117 go a bit further in addressing the problems faced by
attorneys practicing in group situations, including partnerships
and public service entities. Model Rule 5.1(a) states: "A partner
in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all
lawyers in the firm conform to the rules of professional con-
duct.""' Although Model Rule 5.1(a) refers to "a partner," the
official comments to the rule clarify that the provisions of
112. See Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924,936 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that
ethical rules constitute some evidence of the standards required of attorneys).
Commonly in legal malpractice cases, experts rely on ethical rules in opining on
the applicable standard of care.
113. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE].
114. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, .JR., & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
§ 5:101 (2d ed. Supp. 1994) (noting that the Model Code took a "single lawyer,
single client" approach).
115. Mary Twitchell, The Ethical Dilemmas of Lawyers on Teams, 72 MINN.
L. REV. 697, 704 & n.19 (1988) (explaining that the Model Code does not recognize
that the division of function and responsibility within a firm can create different
and greater professional responsibility problems than those that confront a solo
practitioner).
116. George W. Overton, Supervisory Responsibility: A New Ball Game for
Law Fi*rms and Lawyers, 78 ILL. B.J. 434 (1990) (referring to the Illinois Code of
Professional Responsibility which was based on the Model Code).
117. A version of the Model Rules has been adopted in approximately 39
jurisdictions. Myer 0. Sigal, Jr. & Susan M. Freeman, Ethical Considerations in
Commercial Transactions, C931 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 83 (1994).
118. MODEL RULES Rule 5.1(a) (emphasis added). In addition to the duties
under Rule 5.1(a), Rule 5.1(b) addresses the responsibilities of supervisory
attorneys.
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section (a) also apply to shareholders in a law firm organized as
a professional corporation."19
The history of the adoption of the Model Rules indicates
that the drafters intended Model Rule 5.1 to establish the
principle of supervisory responsibility without introducing a
vicarious liability concept. 2 ° Model Rule 5.1 establishes an
institutional check on attorneys' conduct by requiring that
partners implement measures giving reasonable assurances
that all attorneys in the firm comply with the rules of profes-
sional conduct.'21 Therefore, under Model Rule 5.1(a), a
partner can be disciplined for his/her own omission in failing to
ensure that the firm implements measures such as docket and
conflict control systems.
122
The Model Rules do not define the specific measures that
must be implemented to be in compliance with Model Rule
5.1(a). The official comments to-Model Rule 5.1 recognize that
the propriety and adequacy of measures depend on the firm's
structure and its practice. As stated, "[i]n a small firm,
informal supervision and occasional admonition ordinarily
might be sufficient. In a large firm, or in practice situations in
which intensely difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more
elaborate procedures may be necessary."12' Regardless of the
size of the firm, Model Rule 5. 1(a) requires that partners create
119. Id. Rule 5.1 cmt. 1. Paragraph (a) refers to "lawyers who have
supervisory authority" over the professional work of a firm or legal department,
including members of a partnership and shareholders in a law firm organized as
a professional corporation, as well as lawyers having supervisory authority in a
law department of an enterprise or government agency.
120. A.B.A. CTR. FOR PROF. RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 153 (1987).
121. Mary C. Daly, Ethical Challenges for Law Departments in the Twenty-
First Century, in SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE LAW DEPARTMENT
MANAGEMENT: CONTROLLING AND REDUCING COSTS 277, 234 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 833, 1993).
122. In an incorporated firm, the directors monitor or oversee corporate
affairs. See A.B.A. Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook,
33 BuS. LAw. 1591, 1600 (1978) (noting that corporate directors assume a duty to
act carefully in fulfilling the important tasks of monitoring and directing the
activities of corporate management). A director who fails to fulfill the duty of care
is liable for the corporation's losses. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 4.01, 7.18 (1994).
123. MODEL RULES Rule 5.1 cmt.
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reasonable safeguards to promote firm-wide compliance with
ethical rules. 24
In order to comply with the requirements of Model Rule
5.1(a), a law firm partner must ensure that the firm imple-
ments measures to monitor compliance with the rules of
professional conduct.'25 Disciplinary authorities could view
the failure to monitor compliance by all attorneys as a violation
of Model Rule 5.1(a).'26 A partner avoids such a violation by
making "reasonable efforts" to ensure that the firm has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that the associates' and
other partners' conduct conforms to the Rules of Professional
Conduct.'27 The official comments to Model Rule 5.1 recog-
nize that partners in private firms "have at least an indirect
responsibility for all work being done by the firm." 128 With
respect to the work and conduct of other partners, the imple-
mentation of a peer review program should meet a partner's
responsibilities under Model Rule 5.1(a).
Commentators have applied the provisions of Model Rule
5.1(a) to all partners in a firm. 29 The Illinois version of the
124. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 114, § 5.1:101 (Supp. 1994) (explain-
ing that the affirmative steps include educational efforts, the institution of routine
procedures for solving ethical problems, and the creation of a general atmosphere
of attention to professional ethics); see also Kathryn W. Tate, The Boundaries of
Professional Self-Policing: Must a Law Firm Prevent and Report a Firm Member's
Securities Trading on the Basis of Client Confidences, 40 KAN. L. REV. 807, 811-17
(1992) (discussing Model Rule 5.1 within the context of a firm's obligation to take
measures to ensure that no firm members engage in insider trading).
125. A.B.A., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1
(1992).
126. See, e.g., In re Lenaburg, 864 P.2d 1052 (Ariz. 1993) (disciplining a
managing attorney for violating Arizona Ethical Rule 5.1 by failing to make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the conduct of firm lawyers conformed to the
rules of professional conduct).
127. For an illustrative case dealing with partners' responsibility to
establish firm policies, procedures, and programs, see HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 114, § 5.1:202 (Supp. 1994). In one illustration, a partner could be disciplined
if another partner had not read the newly promulgated Rules of Professional
Conduct. As suggested, reasonable efforts to ensure compliance with the Rules of
Professional Conduct would include a directive that all firm attorneys study the
rules. Id.
128. MODEL RULES Rule 5.1 cmt. 4.
129. See, e.g., HAZARD & HODES, supra note 114, § 5.2:101 (Supp. 1994)
(noting that Model Rule 5.1(a) effectively says that all partners in a firm are
"supervisory" lawyers per se and, accordingly, are responsible for making
"reasonable efforts" to ensure compliance by members of the firm, including other
partners). If Model Rule 5.1(a) applies to all partners, a partner may not be able
to avoid responsibility under the rule by simply delegating compliance matters to
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Model Rule clarifies that the provisions of Illinois Rule 5.1(a)
apply to all partners. As stated in Rule 5.1(a) of the Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct: "Each partner in a law firm
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the conduct
of all attorneys in the firm conforms to these Rules."1
30
Under Illinois Rule 5.1(a) both the firm and each partner in the
firm could be subject to direct discipline for failure to effect
"measures" giving "reasonable assurance" that all partners' and
associates' conduct conforms to the Illinois Rules of Professional
Conduct. 13
The Committee on Professional Responsibility of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York ("New York Bar
Committee") has also urged that the New York Code of
Professional Responsibility be amended to include provisions for
firm discipline and partner supervision of other partners.
32
Specifically, the New York Bar Committee's report recommend-
ed amendments requiring that firms provide "reasonable"
supervision of their attorneys and requiring that "[p]artners
[be] responsible for supervision of each other's work as well as
the work of associates." s3 According to the committee report,
the proposed changes will encourage the firms to police their
another partner or administrator.
130. ILL. S. CT. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1(a) (1994).
131. See Overton, supra note 116, at 436 (discussing impact of Illinois Rule
5.1(a) and minimum measures a firm should implement to comply with rule).
132. Edward A. Adams, Bar Report Urges Courts Apply Disciplinary Rules
to Law Firms, N.Y. L.J., June 25, 1993, at 1.
133. The New York Bar Committee recommended that Disciplinary Rule 1-
104 be amended to include a section (B) to read:
A law firm shall adequately supervise the work of all partners, associates
and nonlawyers who work at the firm. The degree of supervision
required is that which is reasonable under the circumstances, taking into
account factors such as the experience of the person whose work is being
supervised, the amount of work involved in the particular matter, and
the likelihood that ethical problems might arise in the course of working
on the matter. Partners are responsible for supervision of each other's
work as well as the work of associates, and every lawyer's and non-
lawyer's work should be supervised to some degree. Depending upon the
circumstances, adequate supervision may include steps such as review
of work product, discussion of disclosure issues and other client problems,
review of billing practices, periodic performance reviews, and informal or
formal auditing of records concerning disposition of client funds and
expense reimbursements.
COMMrrrEE ON PROF. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CrrY OF
N.Y., DISCIPLINE OF LAW FIRMS 13 (1993). Cf provisions of Model Rule 5.1
discussed supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
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own attorneys and will "further the model of self-governance
which is the cornerstone of the legal profession."134
C. Factors Affecting Judicial Determination
The proposed New York rule, the Illinois Disciplinary Rule,
and Model Rule 5.1(a) all recognize, for disciplinary purposes,
the management obligation of firm principals."3 5 As attorneys
increasingly seek to limit their malpractice exposure by
organizing as LLPs, LLCs, and PCs, courts will consider the
extent to which firm principals should have a duty to monitor
or supervise their peers and law firm operations. In making
this determination, courts will consider common law, disciplin-
ary rules, and public policy.'
Under the law of some jurisdictions, the liability standards
governing the practice of law in partnerships also govern
shareholders in PCs. 37 Because court opinions have focused
on the professional responsibility of attorneys to the firm's
clients, courts in those states could easily conclude that
principals have an independent duty to monitor their peers. 38
134. COMMITTEE ON PROF. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF N.Y., supra note 133, at 3. The Disciplinary Committee for the First
Department will propose changes to narrow the provisions of the proposed rule.
Telephone Interview with Hal R. Lieberman, Chief Counsel for the Disciplinary
Committee for the First Department, Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York (July 25, 1994).
135. See generally Stephen E. Kalish, Lawyer Liability and Incorporation of
the Law Firm: A Compromise Model Providing Lawyer-Owners with Limited
Liability and Imposing Broad Vicarious Liability on Some Lawyer-Employees, 29
ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 574 (1987) (noting that Model Rule 5.1(a) imposes a responsibil-
ity of general management to institute systems).
136. In other areas involving the public trust and interest, statutes and
regulations impose duties to supervise. For example, under section 15(b)(4)(E) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission can
sanction a broker-dealer if the firm has "failed reasonably to supervise" associated
persons who violate the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 78(o)(b)(4)(E) (1988
& Supp. 1993)..
137. In invalidating the statutory limits on liability, courts have cited the
separation of powers doctrine and relied on the inherent power of the judiciary to
regulate the practice of law. For a critical analysis of this line of cases, see Paas,
supra note 13.
138. See, e.g., First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1983).
In holding that a shareholder in a PC is liable for the misdeeds of other members
of the firm, the Georgia Supreme Court referred to the professional duties of
attorneys in stating: "The professional nature of the law practice and its
obligations to the public interest require that each lawyer be civilly responsible for
his professional acts.... It is inappropriate for the lawyer to play hide-and-seek
in the shadows and folds of the corporate veil and thus escape the responsibilities
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The task of convincing jurists to recognize an independent
duty may be more difficult in those states where courts have
upheld the statutory limits on liability of shareholders. 3 9 In
those states, the courts may fashion a standard of care from the
applicable disciplinary rules. In the event that the state has a
version of Model Rule 5.1(a), the court may impose liability if
the attorneys' conduct fails to meet the requirements of the
applicable disciplinary rule. On the other hand, courts may
refuse to base civil liability on violations of disciplinary rules,
reasoning that disciplinary rules only cover disciplinary
matters. 140
Public policy considerations may also influence courts to
impose an affirmative duty on principals to monitor their peers.
Because firm principals can most effectively monitor their
peers, clients might retain a firm with the reasonable expecta-
tion that firm principals will do just that.'4 ' Additionally,
since firm principals stand to gain most from their peers'
conduct, arguably the firm should also bear the cost of the
activity.' In short, imposing civil liability may serve the
public by encouraging monitoring.
143
of professionalism." Id. at 675.
139. Certain states, "like Alabama and Nevada, provide almost complete
personal liability protection for professional corporation shareholders from the acts
of their co-shareholders and the corporation's ordinary business debts." Alson R.
Martin et al., Protecting the Assets of a Professional or Other Closely Held Business
Owner from Creditors, C796 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 639, 646 (1993).
140. See, e.g., Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 579, 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the Utah Rule of Professional Conduct
5.1(a) created vicarious liability for professional corporation shareholders), cert.
granted, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988), cert. dismissed, Aug. 19, 1988 (unpublished
order). In concluding that a disciplinary rule should not be the basis for civil
liability, the Utah Court of Appeals referred to the official comment to Rule 5.1
which states that the question "[w]hether a lawyer may be liable civilly or
criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of
these Rules." Id. at 582. This comment is based on the official comments to
Model Rule 5.1.
141. See Stephen E. Kalish, Comment: A Departed Partner's Liability for the
Post-Departure Malpractice of Her Ex-Colleagues-A Practical Approach, 70 NEB.
L. REV. 265, 268-73 (1991) (discussing public policy considerations in imposing
vicarious liability).
142. See id. at 270 (referring to the enterprise theory imposing liability on
the firm that stands to gain from the activity).
143. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL
L. REv. 1, 38 (1991) (noting that the prospect of civil liability should give firms a
considerable incentive to monitor properly attorney conduct and to promote a good
law firm infrastructure).
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Finally, the courts may consider the Restatement (Third) of
The Law Governing Lawyers ("Restatement"). " Although the
last draft of the Restatement does not specifically discuss an
independent duty to monitor one's peers, the draft includes a
specific provision relating to vicarious liability of law firm
principals.'45 As stated in chapter four, section seventy-nine:
"A law firm and each of its principals is subject to civil liability
for injury legally caused to a person by any wrongful act or
omission of any principal or employee of the firm who was
acting in the ordinary course of the firm's business or with
actual authority."'"
The commentary following section seventy-nine explains
that the rationale for imposing vicarious liability is based on
principles of respondeat superior or enterprise liability.47 In
addition, the commentary notes that vicarious liability also
helps maintain the quality of legal services by requiring
principals to stand behind the performance of other firm
personnel.'48 As justified, vicarious liability of principals is
appropriate to assure client compensation despite a thinly
capitalized firm.'49
At the last annual meeting, the members of the American
Law Institute ("ALI') requested that the reporters revise the
Restatement section and comment to take into account legisla-
tion allowing attorneys to limit their liability.5 ° The rejection
of section 79 in its present form indicates that the majority of
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative
Draft No. 7, 1994) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. According to a study conducted by
Professor Susan Martyn of the University of Toledo College of Law, an advisor on
the Restatement project, federal and state courts have cited tentative drafts of the
Restatement 61 times in 44 different cases. Of these cases, only two criticize or
refuse to follow the Restatement. Susan Martyn, Judicial Reliance on the Restate-
ment (3d) of The Law Governing Lawyers, PROF. LAW., Feb. 1995, at 8.
145. RESTATEMENT § 79.
146. Id. A footnote to § 79 states that the Council of the American Law
Institute rejected a motion to prefix § 79 by the phrase, "Except as otherwise
provided by statute." Id. § 79 n.5. As stated in the footnote, the supporters of the
motion "believed that it was reasonable... for a legislature to exclude the liability
of a lawyer-shareholder of a professional corporation who has not been involved
in the wrong out of which the liability arises." Id.
147. Id. § 79 cmt. b.
148. Id.
149. Id. The same policy arguments can be made to support recognition of
a duty to monitor one's peers.
150. Telephone Interview with Professor John Leubsdorf, Associate Reporter
for the Restatement (August 17, 1994).
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ALI members refused to approve a provision which failed to
distinguish between ethical responsibility and legal liabili-
ty.'5 ' This action reflects that the bar remains split on the
extent to which principals in firms should be responsible for the
conduct of their peers.
IV. BAR INITIATIVES RELATING TO PEER REVIEW
During the last fifteen years, various bar conferences have
explored peer review.'52 The organized bar's interest in peer
review arose out of the competence movement in the 1970s.
15s
In response to the widespread criticism of the quality of legal
services, attorneys seriously considered peer review as a means
of improving the quality of legal services.' By 1980, William
Smith, as president of the American Bar Association ("ABA"),
hailed peer review as an idea "whose time has come."'55
Fifteen years after this pronouncement, the practicing bar has
yet to embrace the concept of peer review. 56
The American Law Institute-American Bar Association
("ALI-ABA") Committee on Continuing Professional Education
authorized the profession's first project to study peer review.
151. In addressing whether attorneys can practice as PCs or professional
associations, ABA Formal Opinion 303 distinguished between ethical responsibili-
ties and lawyers' legal liability. Paas, supra note 13, at 390. As stated, "All
lawyers within an organization bear a professional responsibility for the legal
services of the organization, whether they are under any personal legal liability
for all of such services or not." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op.
303 (1961) (permitting attorneys to practice as a professional association or PC,
provided that firm observes appropriate safeguards).
152. Since 1980, the American Law Institute-American Bar Association
Committee on Continuing Professional Education has convened various
conferences to consider professional competence and peer review. For an overview
of the committee's peer review initiatives, see A.L.I.-A.B.A. COMM. ON CONTINUING
PROF. EDUC., A PRACTICAL GUIDE To ACHIEVING EXCELLENCE IN THE PRACTICE OF
LAW at ix-xi (1992) [hereinafter PRACTICAL GUIDE]..
153. See A.L.I.-A.B.A. COMM. ON CONTINUING PROF. EDUC., supra note 64,
at ix (discussing peer review in context of the "competence movement" of the
1970s).
154. See PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 152, at ix (noting that criticism of the
quality of services evoked a variety of corrective proposals, including peer review).
155. W. Reece Smith, Jr., Peer Review: Its Time Has Come, A.B.A. J., Apr.
1980, at 451, 452 (explaining that the American Law Institute-American Bar
Association Committee on Continuing Professional Education and other groups
proposed peer review as a remedial program for lawyers who perform inade-
quately).
156. PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 152, at ix.
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The project resulted in the 1980 publication of a discussion
draft of A Model Peer Review System ("Model System").'57
In 1981, the ALI-ABA's National Conference on Enhancing
the Competence of Lawyers ("Houston Conference") 5 ' ad-
dressed the feasibility of the Model System.'59 The conferees
recommended that experimentation with peer review should go
forward. 6 ° The ALI-ABA responded, creating the Peer Re-
view Institute to observe, evaluate, and report on peer review
activities and experiences, including pilot programs.'
Despite these efforts, the ALI-ABA recognized that the
concept of peer review had gained little, if any, acceptance by
157. A.L.I.-A.B.A. COMM. ON CONTINUING PROF. EDUC., A MODEL PEER
REVIEW SYSTEM (Discussion Draft Apr. 15, 1980) [hereinafter MODEL SYSTEM].
After defining the "Criteria of Attorney Competence," the Model System proposed
three forms of peer review: referral peer review, law practice peer review, and
disciplinary peer review. The three types of peer review work in tandem. Referral
peer review commences when third parties such as judges refer an attorney to a
board established by the highest court in the jurisdiction. If the board finds
incompetence, it recommends remedial action. If the referred attorney declines to
participate, the board can report the referred attorney to a disciplinary committee.
If the disciplinary committee finds that the attorney has violated the disciplinary
rules, the committee can order that the attorney participate in a competency
training program. The Model System reserved disciplinary peer review for the
egregious cases of incompetence. Id. Critics insist that disciplinary peer review
and referral peer review are cumbersome, expensive and oppressive. For a
discussion of these criticisms, see Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., To What Extent Can a
Disciplinary Code Assure the Competence of Lawyers, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1211, 1226-
27 (1988). Attorneys and firms can also voluntarily participate in law practice
peer review by requesting that an independent review team audit attorneys'
performance and practice. See MODEL SYSTEM, supra, at 41-44. The audit could
be compared to a report commonly prepared by law practice management
consultants.
158. See A.L.I.-A.B.A. COMM. ON CONTINUING PROF. EDUC., supra note 64.
159. Id. at xi ("The purpose of the conference was to assist leaders ... in
making a dispassionate assessment of the risks, realities, possibilities of action,
and future directions and needs relating to enhancing lawyers' competence.").
160. A.L.I.-A.B.A. COMM. ON CONTINUING PROF. EDUC., LAw PRACTICE
QUALITY EVALUATION: AN APPRAISAL OF PEER REVIEW AND OTHER MEASURES To
ENHANCE PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE at ix (1987) [hereinafter WILLIAMSBURG
REPORT].
161. Id. ALI-ABA has also funded two pilot programs. The North Dakota
pilot program, based on the referral model, was never completed. The Maryland
State Bar Association project resulted in the 1985 publication, Law Practice
Quality Guidelines (Discussion Draft 1985). The Law Practice Quality Guidelines
outlines a self-assessment program for practitioners in large and small law firms,
public agencies, corporate law departments, and solo practitioners. The voluntary
self-assessment study enables attorneys to create mechanisms for improving
quality. WILLIAMSBURG REPORT, supra note 160, at 47.
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the practicing bar.162  In 1985 the ALI-ABA authorized the
Williamsburg Peer Review Conference to consider the bar's
rejection of peer review and to consider other approaches to
quality evaluation.'63 The conference was "called to study the
possibility of a new vision for peer review-the concept of law
practice quality evaluation."' This statement signals a
retreat from any form of external peer review, in favor of an
internal evaluation. 165
In March 1988, the ALI-ABA authorized the Peer Review
Project to investigate the feasibility of a neutral self-assessment
model for use by practitioners. 166  Subsequently, the project,
renamed the "Practice Evaluation Project," produced six drafts
culminating in the publication ofA Practical Guide to Achieving
Excellence in the Practice of Law.'67 As indicated by the name
change, the project was reformulated as a program of self-
evaluation with "the peer being the lawyer's conscience." 68
V. MODELS OF PEER REVIEW
Although the organized bar effectively abandoned law
practice peer review, several law firms and legal service
organizations have implemented peer review programs in an
effort to reduce liability exposure, enhance quality, and attract
clients. 169  These peer review programs involve more than
conventional compensation review.
162. WILLIAMSBURG REPORT, supra note 160, at ix.
163. Id.
164. Id. at x.
165. Predictably, a sentiment shared at the Williamsburg Conference
suggested that peer review may work for other professionals, but law is an "art not
a science." Id. at 327. This sentiment was articulated by one conference
participant who cautioned against comparing the legal profession to other
professions that have peer review. As stated, "[aiccounting, medicine, engineering
are much more sciences .... It will be infinitely more difficult for us to develop
standards because we're more of an art than a science." Id.
166. PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 152, at x.
167. Id. at xi.
168. Id. In using the checklists included in the Model System an attorney
can assess his or her own performance and abilities. See James E. Brill, Long
After the Price Is Forgotten, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 85 (recommending that solo
practitioners use the checklists to complete their own "report card"). Firms can
use the Model System in training and evaluating attorneys.
169.* The Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") was one of the first large
organizations to establish a system for evaluating lawyer performance. See Susan
R. Martyn, Peer Review and Quality Assurance for Lawyers, 20 U. TOL. L. REV.
295, 300-02 (1989) (discussing LSC's monitoring efforts).
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Traditionally, firms' compensation systems have included a
very limited form of peer review. Depending on the terms of
the firm's partnership or shareholder agreement, principals'
work and productivity may enter into the compensation
determination. Some firms use a seniority approach referred to
as a "lock-step system" or "equal sharing system." In a lock-
step system partners are paid uniformly by class, advancing
together until they reach a full-share interest in the firm."'7
Another approach bases compensation on performance, includ-
ing productivity, business origination and other contributions
to the firm. With such an approach, a managing partner or
committee may use a formula or other criteria to determine
each partner's compensation or share.'' In addition to
adjusting partners' shares, firms routinely scrutinize and let go
less productive associates.
172
The production system tends to operate in firms where
attorneys function as loose confederations rather than disci-
plined teams. 173  Because attorneys in confederation firms
develop their own client base with little collaboration or
cooperation among firm attorneys, partners seldom evaluate or
monitor their colleagues' work.' 4  Rather, partner review
amounts to evaluating productivity and calculating partner
compensation. Critics maintain that this profit-driven system
causes attorneys to pursue profits and neglect other values. 7 '
170. Management consultants have identified three basic categories of
compensation and profit division systems: (1) a lock-step system, (2) a subjective,
performance-related system in which some individual or committee subjectively
determines a relative value for each partner, and (3) an objective, performance-
related system in which partners' compensation is based on various criteria. See
Robert I. Weil et al., Paying Partners and Stockholders: A Multi-faceted Decision,
LEGAL ECON., Mar. 1987, at 26, 32-36.
171. For a comparison of the economics of the lock-step system (the sharing
approach) to the productivity system (the marginal product approach), see Gilson
& Mnookin, supra note 41, at 341-53.
172. Richard N. Feferman, Raising Lawyers for Fun and Profit, LAW PRAC.
MGMT., July-Aug. 1993, at 28.
173. See Weil et al., supra note 170, at 28.
174. Id. (noting that attorneys in confederation firms enjoy a sense of
independence and lack of accountability because each lawyer is viewed as a master
of his or her craft).
175. Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91
MICH. L. REV. 2075 (1993). In responding to Judge Harry T. Edwards' complaints
in The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992), Professor Gordon recommends a number of reforms to
offset the perverse incentives of the compensation system based on "you eat what
you kill." One recommendation is that firms employ committees to review lawyers
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Partially in response to this criticism, some firms have initiated
peer review measures that go beyond compensation review.
Many firms have adopted policies and procedures for all
116firm attorneys. A firm may institute "cold review" proce-
dures which require that reviewing attorneys be detached from
the matter under review.'77 For example, many firms now
require that in-house specialists scrutinize opinion letters.'
7 8
Other firms have developed legal systems that consist of
written procedures for the comprehensive performance of
professional tasks.'79  Such written legal systems create
objective standards for measuring the performance of individual
attorneys.' To the extent that the firm expects partners'
compliance with legal systems and other policies and proce-
dures, the firm has a form of peer review.'
81
Rather than assuming partner compliance with firm policies
and procedures, firms can implement programs to monitor
actual partner compliance. In such a program, a team of
pressured into dubious conduct and that firms employ compensation schemes that
impose heavy penalties for ethical violations. Gordon, supra, at 2109-10.
176. See Amy Bach, Partners Succumb to Checkups from Peers, AM. LAW.,
May 1992, at 30 (quoting a management consultant with Hildebrant, Inc. who
reported that "one quarter of the 200 firms [he] advises have instituted some kind
of program to assess the quality of partners' work").
177. See David A. Schaefer, Avoiding Malpractice Claims: Help Yourself
Because Juries Won't, 60 DEF. CouNs. J. 584 (1993) (noting that certain areas of
practice lend themselves to "cold review" procedures such as sanctions motions
being reviewed by a litigator not involved in the litigation or securities offering
documents being reviewed by a corporate attorney not involved in the offering).
178. Stephen R. Volk et al., Law Firm Policies and Procedures in an Era of
Increasing Responsibilities: Analysis of a Survey of Law Firms, 48 BUS. LAW.
1567, 1574 (1993) (surveying firms' policies and procedures, finding 15 of 26
respondents reported they followed the practice of second partner opinion review).
179. For a description of the steps involved in developing legal systems, see
Stephen P. Gallagher, The Law Firm's Role in Attorney Performance Review,
LEGAL ECON., July-Aug. 1986, at 35. As explained, these legal systems will assist
firms in establishing performance standards for a constructive, educational peer
review process which contributes to the quality of collective office practice and
individual professional development. Id. at 36.
180. Id. While some systems could be firm-wide, other systems must be
tailored according to legal specialty. For example, the securities section of the
firm would adopt due diligence procedures, while the litigation section would use
checklists for filing and answering pleadings.
181. See William Freivogel, Specific Forms of Partner Peer Review (Apr. 19-
20, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Colorado Law
Review) (originally prepared for the A.B.A. Standing Committee on Lawyers'
Professional Liability Conference, Partner Peer Review: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come) (discussing additional techniques firms have developed).
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partners will judge partners' work against measurable technical
standards. The technical standards review evaluates compli-
ance with certain procedural standards meant to improve the
quality of the firm's work product and delivery of services, along
with its profitability.'82 At the same time, the process does
not measure attorneys' competence or substantive knowl-
edge.'83 During the process attorneys examine selected client
files to ensure compliance with the technical standards.'
In 1988, the Denver-based firm of Rothgerber, Appel,
Powers & Johnson ("Rothgerber") implemented a technical
standards review program.'85 Each year, at a time other than
compensation setting time, a team reviews each partner.'86
Using a technical standards checklist, the team reviews client
files to determine if the reviewed partner complied with clearly
defined technical standards. In addition, the Rothgerber
program now includes an interview with the reviewed part-
ner.'87 This interview gives both the reviewing team and the
reviewed partner an opportunity to discuss matters such as
billings, utilization of associates, workload, and frustrations.
The last page of the checklist sets forth the goals that the
reviewed partner should strive for in the next twelve months
and the reviewing team's comments and observations. The
reviewing ' team then provides the completed form to the
182. Richard K. Clark, Technical Standards Review-1990, at 2 (unnum-
bered) (Apr. 19-20, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of
Colorado Law Review) (originally prepared for the A.B.A. Standing Committee on
Lawyers' Professional Liability Conference, Partner Peer Review: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come); A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROF. LIABILITY, THE
LAWYER'S DESK GUIDE TO LEGAL MALPRACTICE 66 (1992).
183. Clark, supra note 182, at 2 (noting that "[pirocedural standards are not
designed to ferret out bad lawyers, but to improve the performance of a better-
than-average group of lawyers"); see also Kathryn McGlothin, Peer Review-Some
Modern Trends 9 (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of
Colorado Law Review) (originally prepared for the Texas Lawyers' Insurance
Exchange Seminar, The Malpractice Trap: Seminar '90).
184. See Schneider, supra note 66, at 104 (suggesting that the inquiry cover
a number of areas including compliance with firm procedures relating to conflicts
of interest, screening, engagement letters, and entrepreneurial activities with
clients).
185. Clark, supra note 182, at 1.
186. Letter from Richard K. Clark, Managing Partner of Rothgerber, to
author 2 (June 22, 1994) (on file with the University of Colorado Law Review)
(stating that each team consists of two partners assigned by the firm's Peer
Review Committee "with related, but not identical practices, to the partner being
reviewed"); see also McGlothin, supra note 183, at 10.
187. Clark, supra note 186, at 2.
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reviewed partner, who adds his or her comments, observations,
and objectives on the last page of the form. 8'
A more subjective evaluation of a partner's performance taps
associate opinions and perspectives. In such a program,
associates evaluate partners' performance. The San Francisco-
based firm of Morrison & Foerster implemented such a program
in 1988.189 Partner review at this firm begins with each
associate completing a written evaluation of partners with
whom the associate has worked. The managing partner or
department chair reviews the compiled comments and discusses
them with the individual partner.190
Associate comments may provide a special insight into a
supervising partner's competence and manner.' This formal
reporting opportunity may also expose problems that an
associate might otherwise hesitate to raise.' 92 Firms that use
a form of associate review remark that the process serves the
reviewing associates, the firm, and the reviewed partner.193
The last type of partner review, called a "client audit," relies
on information obtained from the clients. Firms use different
approaches inviting clients to evaluate the firm and its attor-
neys. Some client -audits are conducted by independent
consultants who interview clients. 9 4 , The interviewer at-
tempts to elicit a candid evaluation from the client. To obtain
such an evaluation, the attorneys who regularly represent the
188. Id. After the Management Committee reviews the entire form, the firm
retains only the last page. Id.
189. Richard D. Lee, Evaluation of Partners by Associates (Apr. 19-20, 1990)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Colorado Law Review)
(originally prepared for the A.B.A. Standing Committee on Lawyers' Professional
Liability Conference, Partner Peer Review: An Idea Whose Time Has Come).
190. Id. The Rothgerber firm uses a similar approach in their associate
review program. A nonlawyer Chief Operating Officer summarizes the associates'
comments and provides the summary to the associates and the reviewed partners.
Clark, supra note 182, at 3.
191. See Schneider, supra note 66, at 104.
192. See Freivogel, supra note 181, at 3.
193. See Lee, supra note 189, at 1 (describing program benefits). The
evaluation program better enables the firm and each partner to assess strengths
and weaknesses as perceived by associates. At the same time, the associates learn
what it takes to become a good supervisor, and to recognize the link between
becoming good lawyers and having good supervisors. See also McGlothlin, supra
note 183, at 11 (reviewing the favorable observations made by the Director of
Professional Development at Morrison & Foerster, Richard Diebold Lee).
194. See 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 96, § 2.29, at 19-20 (Supp. 1993)
(warning that results are mixed, depending. on the ability of the interview-
er/consultant).
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client do not participate in the interview.'95 In other pro-
grams, such as the one pioneered by the Seattle-based firm of
Perkins Coie, firm partners obtain information and interview
selected clients of the reviewed partner.'
96
At Perkins Coie, the billing partner contacts clients to ask
them to participate in the firm's client audit program. The
billing partner explains that the review is a periodic, standard
procedure, conducted at firm expense to ensure the firm's
performance of high quality legal services. 9 ' Client represen-
tatives then meet with the client audit team. The client audit
team consists of an administrative partner, the billing partner,
and a professional standards committee member.'98 During
the meeting, the team interviews the client to gauge client
satisfaction.'99 Following the meeting, the three firm attor-
neys evaluate the information and seek ways to improve future
legal services.2°° Thereafter, the team meets with the client
and retains all material generated in the client audit pro-
cess.
20 1
Law firm consultants recommend client audits over other
partner review systems because the audits focus on client needs
195. See Schneider, supra note 66, at 104.
196. See Harry H. Schneider, Jr., One Approach to Partner Peer Review: The
Client Audit, LAW. LIABILITY REV., Aug. 1987, at 1.
197. Id. at 3.
198. Bach, supra note 176, at 32. Each partner performs a different
function. The billing partner acts as the principal contact between the firm and
the client, the administrative partner's presence emphasizes the importance the
firm places on the audit, and the partner from the professional standards
committee records and helps evaluate client concerns. Id.
199. During a portion of the meeting, the billing partner steps out in an
effort to facilitate open communication and candor, which enables the client to
comment on the billing partner, as well as other members of the firm. For
specimen forms used by Perkins Coie, see the exhibits to the paper presented by
Harry H. Schneider, Jr., One Approach to Partner Peer Review: The Client Audit,
at exs. A-D (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Colorado Law
Review) (originally prepared for the A.B.A. Standing Committee on Lawyers'
Professional Liability Conference, Partner Peer Review: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come).
200. Id. at 4.
201. Although the actual procedures for the client audit may vary, one
author has identified three basic elements of the successful program: (1) an
initiation procedure designed to select clients on a uniform and consistent basis;
(2) an interview questionnaire that serves as the backbone of the actual interview;
and (3) an effort to train the interviewers and to foster attorney cooperation and
interest. Merrilyn A. Tarlton, Client Interview, in THE QUALITY PURSUIT 175, 176-
77, app. (Robert Greene ed., 1989) (discussing each of these elements and specimen
forms).
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rather than on internal performance standards. °2 The obvi-
ous advantage of the client audit is that it provides information
on the services provided by the firm. The firm can use this
information in evaluating and improving the performance of
associates, partners, and nonlawyers. In addition, the audit
gives the firm the opportunity to improve client relations by
addressing any deficiencies perceived by the client. In meeting
with clients and addressing their concerns, firm management
communicates to clients that they are valued by the firm. In
fortifying client loyalty to the firm and involving the client with
additional firm partners, the client may tend to stay with the
firm in the event that the partner with the primary client
contact leaves the firm.2"3 The client audit also serves a loss
prevention function, by addressing problems and cultivating
satisfied clients less likely to bring claims.20 4 Finally, the
client audit may generate additional business.2 5
Firms report that their clients have warmly received the
audits.20 6 Partners have also reacted positively, requesting
that additional clients participate in the program.2 7 Prospec-
tive clients and legal malpractice underwriters also appreciate
efforts to improve client relations and attorney perfor-
mance.
208
Although client audits serve multiple purposes, such audits
may not provide enough information to judge overall quality
202. See Bach, supra note 176, at 30 (quoting Joel Henning, a senior vice-
president with the legal consulting firm of Hildebrant, Inc.).
203. See 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 96, § 2.29, at 19 (Supp. 1993)
(explaining that the firm will probably have a better chance of retaining clients if
additional partners are involved with the clients, even if only in the peer review
process).
204. Schneider, supra note 196, at 4-5 (explaining that the client audit
program creates a "healthy atmosphere of self-evaluation within the firm, so that
each partner realizes that at any given time his or her clients may be asked to
critique the firm's performance").
205. Bach, supra note 176, at 32. Perkins Coie uses its review to inform
clients about the firm's services, resulting in additional business.
206. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 196, at 5 (indicating that, without
exception, clients express approval of the process); see also Clark, supra note 182,
at 3 (indicating that "clients welcome the opportunity to exchange information").
207. See McGlothlin, supra note 183, at 13 (reporting on the comments made
at the A.B.A. Standing Committee on Professional Liability Spring Conference,
"Partner Peer Review: An Idea Whose Time Has Come").
208. As recognized by Robert O'Malley, vice-chairman and loss-prevention
counsel of the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., Washington, D.C. office,
"a good ... review program can detect some forms of potential malpractice before
clients actually bring a suit." Bach, supra note 176, at 32.
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performance. First, individual clients may not possess the
expertise, ability, time, or access to evaluate attorney perfor-
mance. Second, various aspects of attorney performance go
beyond client satisfaction. For example, a client may be
dissatisfied if an attorney refuses to issue a legal opinion.2" 9
Finally, client audits and peer review programs can be
implemented in connection with 'a firm's TQM program.210
Because a comprehensive quality control program emphasizes
the consistent delivery of quality legal services,2 ' TQM
requires the participation and evaluation of all firm attorneys,
including partners. In focusing on client perceptions, a TQM
program relies on client audits and surveys to gauge client
satisfaction with partners' performance. Firms also rely on
department-level peer review to obtain statistical data to
compare partners' views of the quality of service provided by
each partner.212 Firm management uses this data in measur-
ing improvement and rewarding quality performance.
VI. THE FUTURE OF PEER REVIEW-MERGER OF MANAGEMENT
AND ETHICS
The American legal profession stands at the "crossroads of
change, providing a unique opportunity to assess its past and
chart the ... future."213  Traditionally, law firms grew as
partnerships in which partners shared both profits and
liabilities which accompany partner status.214 In the past,
most firm attorneys practiced in general partnerships in which
unlimited liability provided an incentive to monitor peers.
Because partners shared unlimited liability, the existence of an
209. In issuing legal opinions, attorneys must comply with applicable rules,
regulations and laws. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 2.3 (balancing the needs of
clients and third parties).
210. Although law firms have only recently discovered TQM, the concept
dates back to 1950 when Dr. W. Edwards Deming, a statistician, advised Japanese
businesses to implement statistical quality control. W. Keith Shannon & Russell
J. White, TQM-Ready or Not!, S.C. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 11, 12. For an
entertaining case study of a Detroit firm's TQM program, see JOSEPH V. WALKER
& BARBARA L. CIARAMITARO, TQM IN ACTION: ONE FIRM'S JOURNEY TOWARD
QUALITY AND EXCELLENCE (1994).
211. See John Mixon & Gordon Otto, Continuous Quality Improvement, Law,
and Legal Education, 43 EMORY L.J. 393 (1994) (applying the continuous quality
improvement principles to the practice, teaching, and development of the law).
212. Bower, supra note 76, at 27.
213. Croft, supra note 39, at 1259.
214. Torry, supra note 70, at F5.
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independent duty to monitor their peers seldom arose as an
issue. As attorneys chart a new course by practicing in limited
liability firms, the courts and the legal profession must deal
with the ramifications of the death of the traditional partner-
ship.21 While the courts consider whether firm principals
have a duty to monitor their peers, the legal profession will
reevaluate the role of peer review in the new legal environ-
ment.216
Three approaches to peer review may emerge: (1) the
regulatory approach; (2) the professional liability approach; and
(3) the management approach. Under the regulatory approach,
disciplinary authorities or government regulators may articu-
late and enforce peer review standards. For example, state
disciplinary authorities may discipline an attorney for violating
the state's version of Model Rule 5.1(a).21 7 Similarly, govern-
ment regulators, such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Office of Thrift Supervision
("OTS"),9  may discipline attorneys and require remedial
peer review measures.
215. For an analysis of the long-term effects of the new limited liability
business forms, see Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and
the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (1992) (concluding that the
traditional partnership form would not survive if firms were free to choose
organizational form without tax or regulatory constraints).
216. See Edward C. Roberts, Professional Responsibility after Kaye, Scholer,
S.C. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 38 (suggesting that the Kaye, Scholer litigation will
cause firms to review their governance procedures).
217. For a skeptical view of the prospects of enforcing Model Rule 5.1(a), see
Ted Schneyer, Now Is the Time for Firm Discipline, TEX. LAW., Aug. 24, 1992, at
14, 15 (suggesting that Model Rule 5.1(a) will remain a disciplinary "dead letter"
for large firms as long as enforcement of the rule remains linked to individual
discipline rather than firm discipline).
218. The SEC has disciplined attorneys under Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules
of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1994). The peer review procedure of requiring a
"cold review" of opinion letters was first imposed by the SEC on the firm of White
& Case in the settlement of SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1976-77
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,027. Reinier H. Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 53, 72 n.59 (1986).
219. In seeking to bar Kaye, Scholer from representing federally insured
depository institutions, the OTS relied on their authority under 12 C.F.R § 513.4(c)
(1994). As part of the settlement with the OTS, Kaye, Scholer agreed to comply
with a number of practices and procedures and to evaluate regularly the
performance and conduct of Kaye, Scholer attorneys. Order to Cease and Desist
for Affirmative Relief from Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, In re Peter
Fishbein, No. 92-24, 1992 WL 560945 (OTS Mar. 11, 1992).
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Using the second approach, courts may impose civil liability
if principals fail to monitor their peers. The courts may
determine that client expectations and the professional nature
of law practice require that firm principals be liable. This
professional liability exposure may persuade firms to implement
peer review.
Some firms, such as the ones discussed in part V, are using
the third approach, implementing peer review as an aspect of
good management. Rather than wait for the courts to recognize
the existence of an independent duty to monitor peers, these
firms have identified sound business reasons for voluntarily
implementing some form of partner review. These firms
recognize that they have much at stake, including the firm's
assets and professional reputation.220 In taking the initiative,
firm principals adopt review standards suitable to their
firm.
22 1
In the current competitive environment, peer review and
other quality control measures distinguish a firm from its
competitors.222 Commercially aggressive firms can use peer
review in marketing. Peer review will appeal to unsophisticat-
ed clients who rely on the firm's self-policing. The firm's
commitment to quality control will also impress sophisticated
clients who have the ability and resources to monitor attorneys.
Corporate clients, who represent the majority of law firms'
billings, may come to expect quality controls, including peer
review.
220. Regardless of the type of organization, firm assets will generally be
subject to attachment to pay malpractice judgments. In the event of a claim, the
firm will tap the professional liability policy covering all firm attorneys. The
defense and payment of claims attributed to any insured will reduce the policy's
limits of liability. As a result, any claims made under the firm policy will directly
affect the amount of insurance available to respond to other claims made during
the policy period. In addition, the number and severity of claims will directly
affect the future availability of insurance. This illustrates that claims against any
attorney directly impact principals in all types of firms.
221. The standards formulated by each firm are self-enforcing in that the
firm monitors compliance and determines the appropriate action to take when
attorneys fail to meet the firm's standards.
222. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral
Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 117
(1993) (suggesting that firms that invest heavily in an internal monitoring system
will not reap a commensurate reward unless they can distinguish themselves from
competitors).
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Law firm principals are rethinking whether their firm
should operate as a team with accountability, or as a confedera-
tion of autonomous practitioners sharing offices. Operating as
a confederation, firm attorneys may reject any notion of peer
review, preferring to reorganize in an attempt to limit their
liability. With this approach, peer review does not act as an
internal control protecting the firm and its clients. At the same
time, unlimited liability does not provide an external control on
misconduct.
Eventually, if firms refuse to take responsibility for their
attorneys, leaving clients unprotected, the courts and legislators
may refuse to allow attorneys to limit their liability.22 Firm
attorneys' failure to police themselves may provoke the public
to demand more accountability and outside regulation of
attorneys.224
When given these choices, some firms may accept their
management responsibilities and emulate their corporate
clients in instituting quality control measures.225 These
measures are both firm-driven and client-driven because they
protect the firm and its clients. In voluntarily instituting a
partner review program, firms recognize that the merger of
ethics and management sells in the legal marketplace. While
attorneys' efforts to limit their liability may elevate public
scrutiny of the legal profession, voluntary peer review may help
restore public trust in attorney self-regulation.
223. Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers'
Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1664 (1994) (noting that "state supreme courts
hostile to limited liability for the legal profession may frustrate lawyers' attempts
to seek it").
224. The public's demand for more accountability and outside regulation has
already caused states to include more lay participation in the disciplinary process.
For example, in 1993, California adopted legislation requiring that nonlawyers
hold the majority of the positions on the Complainants' Grievance Panel. CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.11 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994).
225. Duncan A. MacDonald, Speculations by a Customer About the Future
of Large Law Firms, 64 IND. L.J. 593, 595 (1989) (as firms get bigger "they will
need to adopt the common styles of other successful businesses"). One commenta-
tor predicted that large firms' organizational structure will resemble the large
accounting firms, including "centralized management monitoring overall quality
control" and "firm-wide standards." James F. Fitzpatrick, Legal Future Shock:
The Role of Large Law Firms by the End of the Century, 64 IND. L.J. 461, 463
(1989).
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